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CHOICE OR COMMONALITY: WELFARE AND
SCHOOLING AFTER THE END OF WELFARE
AS WE KNEW IT
MARTHA MINOW†
ABSTRACT
Reflecting market rhetoric but also potentially advancing spiritual
and religious values, school voucher plans dominate current debates
on education reform. These voucher plans would enable parents to use
public dollars to select private schools, including parochial ones, for
their children. Moreover, the recent federal welfare reform includes the
“charitable choice” provision, which enables states to issue vouchers to
individuals who can redeem them for services and aid from private, in-
cluding religious, entities. In this Article, Professor Minow predicts
that constitutional challenges to these plans under the religion clauses
are likely to result in judicial approval of school vouchers and judicial
rejection of charitable choice, even though she finds school vouchers
the more troubling policy and charitable choice the more promising
one. Both kinds of proposals raise challenging questions about indi-
vidual choice, its reliability, and its importance relative to the need for
commonality in society sufficient to bridge plural and potentially di-
vided communities. Yet, both proposals are superior to simplistic al-
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ternatives that assign responsibility for schooling and welfare entirely
to homogeneous communities, to the federal government, or to each
individual. Voucher proposals, if regulated, can establish constructive
partnerships between governments and private, including religious,
entities at the local, state, and federal levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Private individual choice is a central cultural and legal value in
the United States. Often a slogan, it sustains rationales for free-mar-
ket economic arrangements and constitutional liberties to parent, to
exercise religion, and to speak.
1 Thus, it is probably not surprising
1. On the rise of choice as the vital American focus, see generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, THE  REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY,  AND  CULTURE (1990). Many
scholars identify how the rhetoric of free choice in varied settings masks sharp constraints on
choice. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 73, 152 (1988) (“Surrogacy
for hire is probably with us for the long term, but society can afford to move slowly in evolving
toward the new era of options in childbearing.”); MORTON  J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 1870-1960, at 33-
63 (1992) (discussing the rise of contractual freedom in the 20th century and the systemic
changes that have accompanied its growth); Paul Gerwitz, Choice in the Transition: School De-
segregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 742 (1986) (“The rhetoric of free
choice can mask the fact that the chooser is not allowed to have whatever he wants; in fact, hisMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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that private individual choice has surfaced as an organizing frame-
work for important reforms of two public systems widely thought to
be failing: public schooling and public provision of welfare.
For public schooling, the solution is “school choice,” a phrase that
encompasses proposals both for vouchers to pay for private schools
and for charters to enable new, entrepreneurial public schools. Under
each of these plans, parents are permitted to select the schools their
children will attend. For public provision of welfare, the solutions al-
ready in place in federal law include both time limits for public assis-
tance and “charitable choice.” The latter enables states to contract
directly with private providers, including religious ones, for the provi-
sion of social services, as well as to issue vouchers to individual re-
cipients redeemable for private, often religiously based, assistance.
Encircling both solutions is wary skepticism of public institutions and
government.
2 Blamed for inefficiencies and an absence of values,
public schools and public welfare need a jolt of competition, or per-
haps they should be replaced by private, largely religious providers—
or so voucher advocates suggest.
3
Reliance on vouchers for schooling and welfare indeed can pro-
mote competition, pluralism, and at least the appearance of private
choice. However, such reliance risks diminishing the sense of “we,”
the collective to which everyone in the country should feel connected
or responsible. Vouchers seem to convert public expenditures for
public purposes into individualized consumer choices, and this shift
choice of school must be made from a finite ‘opportunity set.’”); Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1559 (1991) (stating that
framing women’s rights as a matter of equality requires “a challenge to rhetoric of choice,
which deflects attention away from the constraints within which women’s choices occur”).
2. See generally WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT ix (Joseph Nye et al. eds.,
1997) (introducing essays discussing “a widespread loss of confidence in and a dissatisfaction
with government as it is currently functioning”).
3.S e e  J OHN  E. CHUBB  & TERRY  M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS ix (1990) (proposing “a shift away from a system of schools controlled directly by
government—through politics and bureaucracy—to a system of indirect control that relies on
markets and parental choice”); John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, America’s Public Schools:
Choice Is a Panacea, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1990, at 5 (“What we propose is a new system
of public education that eliminates most political and bureaucratic control through markets and
parental choice.”); James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619, 619
(1994) (suggesting that choice would “empower” teachers and “engage” parents); see also Mar-
tha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORD. L. REV. 257, 258 (1999) [hereinafter Minow,
Reforming School Reform] (noting that voucher advocates “gather under the banner of
‘choice’”). For a thoughtful, critical view of these claims, see James S. Liebman, Book Review,
Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, supra).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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to private providers eliminates or shrinks the common spaces created
by public schools and public assistance. Both recipients and providers
can retreat from a sense of the collective good to commitments to
smaller and perhaps more homogeneous groups, especially if the pri-
vate providers are affiliated with a particular religious group. Even
more troubling is the possibility that people who are neither provid-
ers nor recipients can come to see schooling and caring for the poor
as outside their sphere of concern. Indeed, they can come not to see
these increasingly privatized projects at all.
In a nation as diverse and complex as ours, the tasks of schooling
and caring for the poor cannot be managed entirely, or even largely,
by private institutions. Private institutions lack sufficient resources.
Even if these private institutions are subsidized through public re-
sources, they remain insufficient to promote the public purposes of
social cohesion, equal opportunity, and respect for religious and eth-
nic diversity. Because schooling directly involves preparation of each
new generation for adult roles, concern about the large, encompass-
ing good is vital to the establishment of public values in general. But
even the provision of welfare deeply implicates core values such as
equal respect and individual liberty, not just for welfare recipients
but also for the nation as a whole. These public values, embraced by
the Constitution, require complex connections between public and
private institutions, between general norms and individual freedom,
and between secular and religious activities.
4
4. Powerful and attractive elaborations of such public norms appear in the works of John
Rawls. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1972); John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vul-
nerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1245, 1315 (1994) (“To single out one of the ways that persons come to understand
what is important in life, and grant those who choose that way a license to disregard legal
norms . . . is to defeat . . . our commitment to toleration.”). Valuable efforts to formulate what
equal regard could mean appear in Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History: Liberal The-
ory and Human Experience, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 1037 (1986) (arguing that the liberal agenda
must be defended by “arguing from a completely articulated theory of human interests and ex-
perience on which it rests”), and in Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Essay, Yoder and the Ques-
tion of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 789 (1996) (discussing the extent to which the concept of
equality shapes the understanding of religious decrees). See generally R ONALD  DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (theorizing adjudication within a democracy that requires both commit-
ment to overcoming injustice and an acknowledgment of disagreement about the meaning of
justice); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 99 (1991) (exposing the difference be-
tween egalitarianism and commitments to reward people in accordance with their productive
contributions); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (considering the sources and the expression of public norms).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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Paradoxically, the turn to vouchers in the current moment reflects
both the triumph of the market as the preferred mode for social or-
ganization and the resistance to the market mounted especially by
people attached to particular religious traditions. After exploring this
paradoxical development, I offer both legal and policy analyses of
school and welfare vouchers. I suggest that school vouchers are
probably constitutional, but troubling in terms of policy; on the other
hand, welfare vouchers raise more thorny constitutional problems,
but could be good policy.
Whatever the difficulties of the current proposals, they never-
theless hold more promise for meeting the complex demands of con-
stitutionality and good policy than the more simplistic alternatives for
social provision. The Article considers three simplistic alternatives
that underlie policy debates: leaving each community to care for “its
own,” assigning responsibility for schooling and welfare support en-
tirely to centralized government, or leaving it instead in the hands of
individuals and their immediate families. I show that each of these al-
ternatives is unworkable, undesirable, and potentially unconstitu-
tional. By urging resistance to the temptation to reach for simplicity,
I seek to cultivate appreciation for deliberately complex solutions.
Indeed, combinations of individual responsibility and private sub-
community social provisions, joined with coordinating governmental
structures, characterize our history
5 and should guide our future. As a
tool for this vision, vouchers can promote pluralism, social cohesion,
quality, and equality, and they can help create complex partnerships
between private groups and federal and state governments. Vouch-
ers, however, need to be framed more explicitly to advance pluralism
and social cohesion, while sustaining and enlarging the settings of
public discussions about how this society should meet the needs of
poor people and all children. Greater access to improved public and
private options and strengthened guarantees can improve school and
welfare voucher proposals in both constitutional and policy terms.
By calling for complex solutions, I also mean to describe and de-
fend efforts to enhance both individual freedom and social solidarity.
This nation, reflected in its Constitution and laws, embraces complex
and multiple social values: freedom and communality, equality and
religious variety, individual and communal responsibility. These mul-
5. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text; infra Part III. For a rich exploration of
the roots of American pluralism, see generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1972).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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tiple values are not simply distinct and competing; they are also
linked and interdependent. As manifested in our legal system, indi-
vidual freedom relies on a collective structure of rules and institu-
tions. Religious pluralism relies on overarching laws mandating tol-
erance but also setting limits on the government’s involvement and
support. At work in these arrangements are nuanced understandings
of the interdependence of individuals, of individuals and groups, and
of people and governing structures. No one can make it through life
all alone, and no group ever sustains itself without the support and
respect of the larger polity. We need plural communities, institutions,
and structures; we also need the larger public framework devoted to
that plurality and to individuals who may, but also who may not, be
comfortably situated within a caring community.
6 How we respond to
6. Emerging at the turn of the century, pluralism as an American philosophy insisted on
the plurality and distinction of things and the impossibility of a single law or frame for encom-
passing all domains of being, even while exploring forms of unity. See J EAN  WAHL, THE
PLURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 317-18 (1925) (listing in chronological
order various definitions of pluralism). Especially as developed by William James, pluralism
offered a theory of knowledge that stressed the multiplicity of knowers and forms of knowl-
edge. See WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE 321-22 (1909) (“[T]he pluralistic view
which I prefer to adopt is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-form at
all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it may remain out-
side of the largest combination of it ever made  .  .  .  .”); see also N ELSON  GOODMAN  &
CATHERINE Z. ELGIN, RECONCEPTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ARTS AND SCIENCES 24
(1988) (“A number of independently acceptable systems can be constructed, none of which has
a claim to epistemological primacy.”); HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION
30-31 (1995) (describing Kant’s tendency toward pluralism, particularly in the various interac-
tions between the scientific image of the world and the moral image of the world). Horace
Kallen described cultural pluralism as the preservation of each ethnic group rather than a
melting pot in which each group loses its distinctiveness. See HORACE M. KALLEN, Democracy
Versus the Melting-Pot, in CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 67, 125 (1924).
Harold Laski suggested that in a pluralist view of culture and politics, the state is only one asso-
ciation to which a person belongs. See H AROLD  J. LASKI,  The Sovereignty of the State,  in
STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1, 19 (1917) (stating that one must regard the
state as only one association to which one belongs “and give it exactly that pre-eminence and
no more”).
More recent theories of interest group pluralism emphasize the importance of groups or-
ganized around particular interests in political activities, but they retain individual autonomy as
a central principle; communitarians and republicans, on the other hand, search for a way to
connect group life and individual fulfillment. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1989)
(“Pluralists and public-choice theorists believe that individuals associate with each other only
to achieve specific ends coincidentally shared. . . . But . . . communitarian theory understands
group activity and individuality as simultaneously present . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, What is
Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1989) (describing
republicanism as boiling down to the core tenet that human beings are essentially political ani-
mals). Moral pluralism, another connected theory, holds that there is not a single good forMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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seemingly appealing ideas today will affect how we fulfill these com-
plex needs in the future.
I. THE MOMENT
  Across the globe, we are witnessing a tidal change in the role of
governments in providing for basic human needs. Western democra-
cies are backing away from the social welfare state created through
democratic politics. In the name of producing stable currencies and of
securing promising positions in the global economic markets, Canada
and countries across Europe are cutting back on social welfare guar-
antees.
7 Here in the United States, devolution of governmental re-
sponsibility to the states constitutes part of a larger withdrawal of the
federal commitment to providing economic relief for the poor, as
originally established by the New Deal.
8 Even formerly socialist
countries like Russia are cutting back on basic social guarantees
ranging from child care to police protection.
9
every individual nor a common measure for evaluating all that is good, but it does not abandon
an ethical commitment to identifying objectively bad and objectively good conditions and ac-
tions. See William A. Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD.
L. REV. 236, 241 (1998). But see JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 204-06 (1993)
(criticizing the theory of moral pluralism).
A leading exponent of this kind of pluralism is Robert Cover. See  NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER passim (Martha Minow et al. eds.,
1992) (developing a conception of pluralist communities within which human norms are gener-
ated); see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of
the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 154 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should recognize the multitude of views and perspectives that exist in American society). One
defect of pluralist ideas when applied to social organization tends to be neglect of individuals
who are not associated with any particular group or who are subject to maltreatment simply
because of their apparent group membership. I mean to address precisely these issues, while
acknowledging the power and attractions of pluralist traditions.
7.S e e  N ICOLAS  SPULBER, REDEFINING THE STATE: PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE
REFORM IN INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSITIONAL ECONOMICS 73-104 (1997) (discussing the revival
of rhetoric about the state’s “excessive” and “inappropriate” expansion in the West); Jonathan
B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the ‘Adapt
or Die’ Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 78 (1995);
Helene Cooper, All of Europe Watches as Britain’s Tony Blair Hacks Away at Welfare, WALL
ST. J., June 25, 1998, at A18.
8. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing welfare reform).
9. In Russia, for example, many individuals now arrange for their own police protection.
See Fred Hiatt, Cities of Violence; Moscow; Police Force ‘Choking on a Flood of Crime’, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at A41 (“‘If the state is unable to provide justice, economic subjects start to
solve problems in other ways, using crime, guns, mafias, and private guards.’” (quoting Arkady
Murashov, a politician and former Moscow police chief)).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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  Taking the place of social welfare guarantees are policies in-
tended to harness the competitive efficiencies of the free market and
to promote individual consumer choice.
10 The rhetoric of competition
and choice permeates reform proposals for numerous programs such
as Social Security, where individual retirement accounts are the
rage.
11 Choice rhetoric also dominates the traditionally public sphere
of children’s schooling.
12 The new ideal, at least as captured in slo-
gans, seems to be maximal individual choice for students and parents
regarding both the type of school attended and its location.
13 School-
10. The vivid phrase “creative destruction” has been used to capture both the growth and
movement that markets promote. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1947) (describing capitalism as a method of economic change that opens
markets, generates new products and organizations, and bombards and destroys existing firms
at their foundations).
  11.S e e  Social Security and the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A24 (describing pro-
posals for individual retirement accounts to supplant Social Security in part or in full); see also
Clifford Krauss, Social Security, Chilean Style, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, §4, at 4 (describing
the United States’ interest in Chilean privately managed, individually owned retirement ac-
counts).
  12. Milton Friedman argued for market approaches to schooling as early as 1962. See gen-
erally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). By 1998, the argument had be-
come mainstream. See Cleveland, supra note 7, at 80 (commenting that without the possibility
of consumer choice, schools have fewer incentives to “provide a quality product to captive cus-
tomers”); Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 37, 37 (1993) (acknowledging that school choice has become the focus of the 1990s educa-
tional debate); Adam Cohen, A First Report Card on Vouchers (April 19, 1999)
<http://cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/04/19/vouchers.html> (on file with Duke Law Jour-
nal). Although choice options may dominate the rhetoric of school reform, they have not yet
prevailed in practice[,?] as evidenced by the small percentage of students actually involved in
charter schools and voucher programs. See Matthew Miller, A Bold Experiment to Fix City
Schools, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1999, at 15, 16 (advocating an expansion of voucher pro-
grams). Miller observes:
Just over 52 million students attend grades K through 12 in the United States. Only
two cities offer publicly funded vouchers: in Milwaukee (whose breakthrough pro-
gram was begun in 1990) roughly 6,000 of 107,000 students get vouchers; in Cleve-
land about 4,000 of 77,000 do. In May, Florida approved a plan under which students
at the poorest-performing schools would get vouchers. Four schools are expected to
be eligible this year, and 12,000 of the state’s 2.3 million K-12 kids are expected to
use vouchers over the next four years. Privately funded voucher programs in thirty-
one cities served roughly 12,000 children last year; ten new such programs came into
being for the 1998-1999 school year. . . .
Add these number up and you get 74,000 children—about 0.1 percent of students.
Add 200,000 for those students in the 1,200 charter schools around the country
(which also give parents a choice), and the proportion comes to only 0.5 percent of
schoolchildren.
  Id.
13. See, e.g., Children’s Educational Opportunity Foundation, The School Choice Debate
(visited Sept. 22, 1999) <http://www.childrenfirstamerica.org/debate.html> (proclaiming “Take
away their choice—Take away their chance”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see alsoMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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ing is increasingly viewed as a private consumption item, instead of a
shared experience for children from all classes, races, and ethnic
backgrounds. Within the public school system, magnet and charter
schools offer students options beyond the neighborhood school.
14
Public school systems experiment with parental choice of particular
school buildings and programs for their children.
15 Public tax credits
and vouchers stretch this expanding arena of choice even farther, so
that even students whose families lack sufficient resources to opt out
of the public system can do so.
16 Fifteen states and the District of
Columbia are considering additional programs to expand the school
choices of low-income parents, or all parents, through vouchers, tax
relief, or other mechanisms.
17 The multitude of state legislative pro-
posals for vouchers, scholarships, and tax credits to enable the selec-
tion of private schools indicates a genuine possibility of major revi-
sion in how society wishes to educate its children.
18
JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 78-96
(1994) (describing school-choice initiatives as market ideology rather than a concrete policy
initiative); Dan Morrison, The Rudys Stand Fast: Two Remain at Odds over Voucher Plan,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1999, at A4 (describing a lobbying organization called Change-NY, which
ultimately seeks a voucher system giving individual families public dollars and the ability to
select private or parochial schools of their choice).
14.S e e  Cleveland, supra note 7, at 96-98 (describing choice models); see also Phillip T.K.
Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems
Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 11, 17 (1993) (describing magnet and charter schools as
public schools with specialized programs and enrollments open to students from across the dis-
trict); Peyser, supra note 3, at 619-32 (describing school-choice models); Justine J. Sayie, Edu-
cation Emancipation for Inner City Students: A New Legal Paradigm for Achieving Equality of
Educational Opportunity, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913, 940 (1994) (arguing that providing vouch-
ers would sever the link between “residential location and school quality”); Priscilla Wohlstet-
ter,  Education by Charter,  in  SCHOOL-BASED  MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR HIGH
PERFORMANCE 139 (Susan Albers Morhman & Priscilla Wohlstetter eds., 1994) (describing a
charter school idea).
15.S e e  Peyser, supra note 3, at 621 (discussing intradistrict public school choice).
16. See id. (discussing private choice based on state-funded vouchers); see also Quentin L.
Quade,  A Primer on Educational Choice (visited Sept. 22, 1999)
<http://www.marquette.edu/blum/primer.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). On the
vexed subject of whether tax credits and exemptions should be viewed in the same way as
vouchers or subsidies, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent
to Direct Expenditures, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998).
17.S e e  Nina Shokraii Rees & Sarah E. Youssef, School Choice 1999: What’s Happening in
the States (visited Sept. 6, 1999) <http://www.heritage.org/schools> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (providing a state-by-state summary of proposed and enacted voucher programs).
Thus far, federal legislation on the subject has been introduced and rejected several times. See
id. (noting that President Clinton vetoed two school-choice bills in 1998).
18. Dramatic reshaping of American education will not happen without contest. Several
lawsuits challenging such state plans recently reached judicial decisions. The Vermont Supreme
Court recently found that the Chittenden School District’s plan to permit parents to use publicMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
502 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:493
  These market-based proposals seem to offer ways to cut through
public bureaucracies. School choice seems the answer for parents and
children who feel that they have had no control over what happens in
public schools. As education becomes ever more central to economic
opportunity and job security, increasing parental choice may provide
an important means of managing some kinds of anxieties about chil-
dren’s futures and frustration with sclerotic state and local bureauc-
racies. Advocates argue that by promoting competition and consumer
sovereignty, school choice would force drastically needed changes
and increase efficiency, even at the price of some failures.
19
  In addition, these proposals reflect growing disillusionment with
public schools and the increasing reliance on private and religiously
affiliated schools to foster the moral, disciplinary, or group identity
aspects of their children’s education.
20 Although seldom discussed,
dollars to send their children to religious schools violated the Vermont Constitution. See Chit-
tenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., No. 97-275, 1999 WL 378244, at *37 (Vt.
June 11, 1999). In contrast, the Maine Supreme Court held that a state voucher plan that ex-
cluded religious schools did not violate the federal Constitution, see Bagley v. Raymond Sch.
Dep’t, 728 A.2d 127, 135, 147 (Me. 1999) (rejecting free exercise, establishment, and equal pro-
tection challenges), and the First Circuit similarly found no constitutional problems with
Maine’s voucher plan, see Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting the same
challenges). The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected First Amendment challenges to a
Cleveland voucher plan that included religious schools.  See  Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711
N.E.2d 203, 208-12 (Ohio 1999). In Wisconsin, the supreme court found that a Milwaukee
choice plan allowing students to attend both sectarian and nonsectarian private schools at tax-
payer expense did not violate the state constitution. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,
613-22 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to review the Wisconsin decision,
Court observers suggest that the emerging conflicts among judicial responses will require Su-
preme Court review before long. See Court Backs Maine Law on School Vouchers, Those Who
Feel the State Should Pay Student Tuition at Religious Schools Vow to Appeal Further,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 2, 1999, at 1A (describing the efforts of voucher proponents
to have a voucher case heard by the Supreme Court). Voucher proposals have also been con-
sidered in Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Minnesota, among other states. See  Terrence
Stutz, Legislative Leaders Focus on Education, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1, 1999, at 3A.
Controversy over vouchers has divided political and community leaders across the country. See,
e.g., Dan Barry, Crew Threatening to Resign His Post as Schools Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1999, at A1 (detailing conflicts over vouchers between Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and school
chancellor Rudy Crew); Council of Great City Schools, Resolution: Private School Vouchers
(Mar. 24, 1996) <http://www.cgcs.org/services/onissues/resol8.htm> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (providing the text of a school council anti-voucher resolution issued in response to
proposals in Congress and in state legislatures).
19.S e e  Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional Guar-
antees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2002 (1996) [hereinafter The Limits of
Choice] (suggesting that a true free market for education will pose an inherent risk of creating
failures as well as successes).
20. Although these are expansive claims about the academic successes of private, and es-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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the disillusionment with public schools began at just about the same
time that these schools took on the task of educating all children, in-
cluding those with disabilities and limited English proficiency, non-
citizens, the homeless, and migrants.
21 The rush of leaders toward
choice proposals both in and beyond public schools may in no small
way respond to the ambitious and troubled diversity in public school
enrollments.
22
  However, the movement for school choice also finds support
from those critical of market values and a secular, competitive
world.
23 Religious leaders and other individuals blame public schools
for inculcating in children a culture of self-interest bereft of any obli-
gations to society.
24 For some, religious values taught in religious
schools can challenge the commercialization of everyday life, includ-
ing the targeting of children as consumers.
25 School vouchers thus
pecially religious, schools, see, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3; JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (1982), it is impossible thus far to separate their apparent suc-
cesses in retaining enrollments and boosting academic performance from the self-selection of
families and the private schools’ abilities to refuse and to expel troublesome students, see Ar-
thur S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive Outcomes in the Cole-
man Hoffer and Kilgore Report, 55 SOC. OF EDUC. 103-22 (1982); J. Douglas Willms, Catholic-
School Effects on Academic Achievement: New Evidence from the High School and Beyond
Follow-up Study, 58 SOC. OF EDUC. 98-114 (1985).
21.S e e  Minow, Reforming School Reform, supra note 3, at 277-80 (discussing how public
schools have moved to include students with disabilities and limited English proficiency).
22. Sources of educational reform agendas are complex. See Chris Pipho, Eagle Eyes and
Rabbit Ears: Locating Policy Issues, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 645, 645-46 (1999).
23.S e e  Perry Glanzer, Religion in Public Schools, 80 PHI  DELTA  KAPPAN 219, 219-20
(1998) (noting that vouchers would help parents who are concerned that the secular values
taught in schools might steer children away from religion); Michael McConnell, Multicultural-
ism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Say?,
1991 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 123, 125-127 (1991) [hereinafter McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majori-
tarianism, and Educational Choice] (arguing that school choice would promote a desirable form
of multiculturalism); Ruti Teitel, Vouchsafing Democracy: On the Confluence of Governmental
Duty, Constitutional Right, and Religious Mission, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
409, 417-18 (1999) (noting that because most private schools are religiously based, vouchers
would effectively shift responsibility for education from the government to churches).
24.S e e  Robert S. Alley, Public Education and the Public Good, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 277, 348 (1995) (arguing that public schools are already balkanized by interest group
pressures and that vouchers will only exacerbate the problem); McConnell, Multiculturalism,
Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice, supra note 23, at 150 (suggesting that the current
public school system, by valuing all perspectives equally, fails to impart any value beyond self-
interest and “teaches our children, unintentionally, to be value-less, culture-less, root-less, and
religion-less”).
25. Spokespersons associated with both the right and left wings in American politics urge
efforts to strengthen civil society—the institutions, associations, and practices that occupy
realms between individuals and the state. See  ADAM  B. SELIGMAN, THE  IDEA OF CIVIL
SOCIETY passim (1992) (discussing the history and relevance of the idea of civil society). A re-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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may offer a way to rechannel taxpayer dollars to schools that instill
values and discipline. Similarly, many people criticize secular social
services for failing to provide a moral framework in which to encour-
age more responsible behavior. The public welfare system, it is said,
fails to forge social connections between those who are isolated and
despised and those who are relatively comfortable and privileged.
26
Moreover, public welfare is faulted for not respecting the individual-
ity or personhood of people in need.
27 To some, religious charities are
more successful at inculcating values and discipline in the poor. Wel-
fare vouchers thus provide a way to turn care of the poor over to such
religious charities.
  Academics and pundits, too, argue that a vital democracy de-
pends on individuals’ engaging in mutual aid and recreation apart
from the market or the polity. Robert Putnam’s work is among the
most renowned.
28 His research indicates that self-government and
lated project is the promotion of a communitarian agenda, which has support from both the
right and left wings of the American political spectrum. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT
OF  COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN  AGENDA  passim
(1993) (advocating increased emphasis on community as an alternative to big government);
WILLIAM  SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING  PUBLIC  PHILOSOPHY  208-27 (1986) (calling for
America to foster civil society and civic involvement by strengthening communities and em-
phasizing the need for interdependence among people). This sort of advice is often directed to
emerging democracies, such as those in Eastern Europe, and is suggested as a means by which
such countries could reduce government involvement in economics and social life. However,
the advice is no less applicable to free-market, industrialized societies, in which civic participa-
tion has declined drastically. Thus, the market idea is interdependent with the existence of
thriving, private cultures, such as religious communities, that can cultivate the qualities of trust,
hard work, and emotional support that markets paradoxically require or jeopardize.
  26. There is a notable distinction, however, between opposition to public welfare per se
and opposition to secular provision of public dollars for dependents, since those same dollars
could be channeled through private religious groups. Some religiously motivated arguments are
antimarket (although others are friendly to capitalism); some are antigovernment; some oppose
the teaching of secular and egalitarian values; some oppose what they regard as the amorality
communicated by public institutions such as schools and welfare agencies. On the varieties of
conservatism in the United States, see generally RALPH E. ELLSWORTH & SARAH M. HARRIS,
THE AMERICAN RIGHT WING (1962); GILLIAN PEELE, REVIVAL AND REACTION: THE RIGHT
IN  CONTEMPORARY  AMERICA (1984); Alan Wolfe, The Revolution That Never Was, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 7, 1999, at 34 (reviewing books on conservatism).
27. See, e.g., MARVIN N. OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 233 (1992)
(commenting that governmental welfare programs are deficient in “treating people as peo-
ple”).
28.S e e  R o b e r t  D .  P u t n a m ,  Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65, 66 (1995) [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone] (arguing that American civil
society is in decline because fewer Americans participate in social institutions and informal
community activities, such as bowling); Robert D. Putnam, Tuning in, Tuning out: The Strange
Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 664, 664-83 (1995) (dis-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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civic participation are closely tied to degrees of communal connec-
tion and involvement.
29 Without the kinds of ties forged by bowling
leagues, volunteer groups, mutual aid societies, and religious organi-
zations, civic engagement suffers.
30 Indeed, both Republican and
Democratic leaders urge efforts to strengthen civil society, especially
the use of nonprofit organizations and community groups to meet the
needs of vulnerable and at-risk groups.
31
  Nevertheless, this call for more is often coupled with policies of
less. Congress recently ended the federal welfare entitlement.
32 Local
communities have widely rejected school levies and criticized the
costliness of public education expenses, such as special education for
students with disabilities.
33 Contemporary public debate thus reflects
a complex mixture of confidence in market competition and effi-
ciency, individual choice, pluralism, and private religious institutions,
cussing possible reasons why Americans appear to be participating less in civil society). For
critiques of Putnam’s work, see MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LIFE 296-98 (1998) (analyzing possible shortcomings in Putnam’s data and sug-
gesting that “even if Putnam’s data holds up, it would still be premature to infer from it a de-
cline in civic participation”); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2154 n.8 (1996) (detailing several criticisms of Putnam’s work); Katha Pollitt, For Whom the
Ball Rolls, NATION, Apr. 15, 1996, at 9 (offering a critique of Putnam’s Bowling Alone).
29.S e e  Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 28, at 66-67.
30. See id. at 67.
31. Former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, a Democrat, and former Mayor of Indianapolis Ste-
phen Goldsmith, a Republican, are two politicians committed to strengthening civil society. See
Conversation with Thomas Sander, Program Director, Saguaro Seminar, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University (Sept. 1, 1999). Bradley is currently running against
Vice President Gore to be the Democratic party’s nominee for President, see Adam Clymer, A
Surprise Possibility: A Dignified Democrat Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A28, while
Goldsmith is now a policy advisor for Republican presidential contender Governor George W.
Bush and continues to advocate collaborations between government and religious organiza-
tions, see Dana Milbank, What W. Stands for: Wishy-Washy or Wise?, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26,
1999, at 66 (discussing Goldsmith’s political positions).
32. For example, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, commonly known as the Welfare Reform Act, markedly cut back the federal govern-
ment’s involvement in providing social services to the needy. See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
33. The difficulty of passing tax levies to support public schools has been widely noted.
See, e.g., Ann Fisher et al., State-Aid Pledge Swayed Voters, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 5,
1998, at 1A (describing a successful school bond issue that followed a string of rejected school
levies dating back to 1968); Robert Starr, Legislative Race Set by Primary, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 9, 1999, at 5 (describing repeated failures to authorize tax overrides in towns seeking
funding for public schools). On concerns about costs of special education, see Norman Draper,
Minneapolis School Budget Balanced; Board’s Intended Cuts Much Less Painful Than Ex-
pected, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 23, 1999, at 3B.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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and of distrust or disdain for collective social provision. The political
tilt of the voucher debates is therefore complex. School-choice poli-
cies, for example, seem to appeal to both suburban middle-class par-
ents and inner-city working-class parents, who each seek more con-
trol over the very different educational options available to their
children.
34 Voucher programs are the perfect meeting ground for both
market believers and market critics.
  Vouchers, however, should prompt several questions: Would
vouchers enabling individuals to purchase private, religious schooling
and social welfare services harmfully blur the boundaries between the
public and private spheres? Would they offer more people exits from
common life into private sectors divided by religion, race, and/or
class? Would increasing activity by religious groups in schooling chil-
dren and in providing food, shelter, childcare, job-training, counsel-
ing, and treatment so alter the nation’s fabric as to shrink what is
public or to alienate those who differ from the religious affiliations of
growing schools and service providers?
  The first response to such questions must be that the blurring of
public and private, secular and religious, already exists throughout
the United States. Private organizations, particularly those that are
religiously affiliated, already play major roles in the provision of
schooling, food, shelter, and social welfare services, as well as health
care.
35 Often such private organizations work closely with the state
through contracts, reimbursement from public third-party payers,
other material assistance, and referrals.
36 Consider, for example, the
34. See, e.g., Cal Thomas, Opponents Speak for Themselves, Not the Poor: Learning to
Love School Choice, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 6, 1999, at A16 (citing a Phi Delta Kappa
Gallup Poll indicating that 56% of parents with children in public schools support school
choice, with higher percentages in some minority and low-income communities). Note that the
largest school-choice policy—the districting system that allows affluent families to move to ex-
clusive suburbs and to deduct high property taxes from taxable incomes—excludes those with-
out sufficient resources. See Prepared Testimony of Joe Nathan Ph.D. and Director Center for
School Change, University of Minnesota Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs Before House
Education and the Workforce Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, May 25, 1999.
35.S e e  LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE
1876-1980, at 273-321 (1988) (describing the role of public and private social service institutions
in providing and supporting education); see also Catholic Charities USA(visited Aug. 31, 1999)
<http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the ac-
tivities of a Catholic charitable organization); United Methodist Church Official Site: Faith in
Action (visited Aug. 31, 1999), <http://www.umc.org/faithinaction> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (describing the activities of a Methodist charitable organization).
36. See Comments of Father Brian Hehir, Harvard Divinity School Seminar on Demo-
cratic Revival (Mar. 9, 1998); see also Ernest Tucker, More Parishes Running in the Red, CHI.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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roles played by Catholic Charities USA, and Catholic schools, par-
ticularly in urban areas across the country. Local parishes have pro-
vided schools and assistance to the poor with no public support (be-
yond tax exemption) since colonial times.
37 Changing demographic
patterns and the policies launched by the second Vatican Council in
1962 promoted a deliberate shift in church-run services and schools.
38
Rather than focus exclusively on serving Catholics, the services and
schools now support diverse populations in need and work to ad-
vance a human society by modeling human cooperation for the com-
mon good.
39 Of course, these church-run activities may also be seek-
ing converts. For many working-class people, including many non-
Catholics, Catholic schools afford avenues for educational advance-
ment, moral development, and order in the midst of urban decay.
40
Furthermore, public school systems implicitly depend on the exis-
tence of Catholic schools to provide slots for children otherwise eligi-
ble for public schooling, depending upon the particular surges and
declines in school-aged enrollments.
41
  In the contexts of child protective services, foster care, and health
care, the functional and financial ties between religiously based pro-
grams and public commitments are even stronger.
42 Catholic agencies
receive contracts from municipalities to provide child protective
services and foster care, job training and drug counseling, and food
pantries and homeless shelters.
43 Catholic hospitals serve Medicare
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at 40 (noting that the Chicago city government provided emergency
financial assistance to private Catholic schools in the Chicago area).
  37.S e e  ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 17-18
(1993) (describing the early history of Catholic schools in America).
38. See id. at 46-51.
39. See id. at 10, 51-54.
40. See id. at 52-54; Lona O’Connor, In Vouchers, Archdiocese Sees Way to Save Inner-
City Schools, SUN-SENTINEL  (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 21, 1999, at 4B (discussing the role of
Catholic schools in providing quality opportunities for poor children, and the potential role of
private donations in expanding the number of students who can enroll in Catholic schools).
41. See Rodney J. Thoulion, Editorial, Let’s Work Together to Improve Education, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 8, 1999, at B6 (“If our Catholic schools ceased to exist, stu-
dent transfers to public schools would bankrupt the state. Nonpublic school students number
125,000 statewide, which saves taxpayers over $370 million.”); Tucker, supra note 36, at 40
(noting that Catholic schools enroll over 131,000 students in the Chicago area).
42. See Conversation with Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, Harvard Law School (Sept. 2,
1999); see also Eileen Swift, “Mr. Tom”: He’s a Real Class Act, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1995, at A70
(documenting how a Catholic agency places children in foster care and houses children on its
campus).
43. See, e.g., Steve Chapman, A Judge’s Tunnel Vision on School Vouchers, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 29, 1999, at C21 (“Government funds cover no less than 74 percent of the budget forMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
508 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:493
and Medicaid patients, Catholics as well as non-Catholics.
44 Heads of
public departments and agencies regularly rely on programs created
and run by Catholic agencies (as well as programs created and run by
other religious groups) in order to provide responses to human needs
as authorized by their public mandates.
45
  Instead of trying to place walls of separation between public and
private, and between church and state, only to breach or ignore them
again and again, it would be more appropriate to determine how to
allocate responsibilities in a world that mixes public and private.
46 In-
deed, we should think about ways to promote partnerships between
public and private in order to enhance the actual delivery of services,
to respect human individuality and group affiliations, and to enlarge
intellectual and moral resources for dealing with the potentially de-
structive features of global markets.
 That said, the allocation question
should not obscure the larger issue of responsibility. What matters is
not just who delivers schooling or aid to the destitute, but who is re-
sponsible for seeing that it is actually provided. Religious groups en-
act one vision of responsibility, but they do not and cannot substitute
for a broader umbrella covering multiple religious groups, as well as
Catholic Charities of Chicago.”); Torry Minton, S.F. Archbishop Agrees to Discuss Partners
Policy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 1997, at A21 (“About 40 percent of the Catholic Charities budget
[in San Francisco] flows through City Hall.”).
44. The widespread reliance of communities on Catholic hospitals as chief health care
providers willing to serve Medicaid patients can pose problems since patients may want birth
control that the Catholic institutions will not provide. See Jayne O’Donnell, Antitrust Health
Fight: Catholic Hospital Deals Limit Access, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 1999, at 1B (noting how low-
income Medicaid recipients lose access to birth control because the only available hospitals are
Catholic hospitals that do not provide those services).
  45. Catholic Charities of Chicago, for example, receives 74% of its budget from public
money; for Catholic Charities of San Francisco, the figure is closer to 40%. See Chapman, supra
note 43; Minton, supra note 43. Religious charities often perform public contracts in the fields
of child protection, foster care, adolescent counseling, and substance abuse counseling. As
public welfare programs have diminished, pressure on religious charities to meet the needs of
those who used to be able to turn to governmental programs has increased. See, e.g., LISBETH
B. SCHORR, COMMON  PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING  FAMILIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS TO
REBUILD AMERICA 93-94 (1997) (describing how reductions in government services have in-
creased the demands on charitable organizations); Sandi Dolbee, Preacher to Unite Ministries
by Donning Government Role, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 11, 1998, at E1 (describing a
minister who was hired by a county government to help catalog religious charities and to im-
prove public access to them as part of a county campaign to reduce government welfare expen-
ditures). New developments, such as the charitable choice provision depart from past practices
by permitting public contacts with churches themselves, rather than with the nonprofit arms of
the religious organizations. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
  46.S e e  infra Part II.A (rejecting doctrinal formulation of religious clauses in terms of a
wall of separation).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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people neither choosing nor chosen by religious communities.
 On a
more practical note, the financial bankruptcies of so many Catholic
schools and agencies give some clue as to why they cannot accept ul-
timate public responsibility for providing schooling and social wel-
fare.
47 Religious leaders have been among the most outspoken in ob-
jecting to the prospect of turning social provision entirely over to pri-
vate charity.
48  Some form of shared responsibility, connecting gov-
ernments with private groups (both religious and nonreligious) seems
both most practical and most fitting.
  Yet, no practical and coherent conception of social provision can
proceed without facing the constraints imposed by the United States
Constitution and its interpretation by the courts.
 I thus examine the
legal constraints on methods of social provision, paying particular at-
tention to the protection of religious liberty and the prohibition
against state establishment of religion.
II. LAWS
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution sets lim-
its on social provision arrangements involving the government. Spe-
cifically, the First Amendment prohibits the federal government and
the states from conducting themselves in a way that amounts to either
a governmental establishment of religion or a burden on individuals’
free exercise of religion.
49 Mentioned first in the Bill of Rights, the
religion clauses may overlap with but also remain distinct from other
47.S e e  Nina J. Easton, The Year of 2016 and American Society Has Finally Become Civi-
lized, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1996, at 22 (noting how Catholic Charities nearly faced bankruptcy
in 1995); Alva James-Johnson, Social Service Agencies Facing a Refocusing, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Oct. 18, 1995, at 15SF (describing how Catholic Charities was closing residential fa-
cilities because of costs); Steve Kloehn, Cash-Strapped Archdiocese Drops Charter-School
Ideas, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1999, at 1 (discussing how the archdiocese abandoned ideas for char-
ter schools because the Catholic school system was financially strapped); Tim O’Neil, Archdio-
cese Seeks to Lower Debt, ST. LOUIS  POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1995, at 12A (describing a
Catholic archdiocese that had been running budget deficits for nine years); Ernest Tucker,
George Shapes His Inside Circle, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 2, 1999, at 24 (describing various prob-
lems in a large Chicago archdiocese, including financial problems with church-run Catholic
schools).
48. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
49. The text of the First Amendment states, in part: “Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I, cl. 1. The Supreme Court applied the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause to
the states in 1963. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215
(1963).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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rights, including the freedoms of speech and assembly and the guar-
antees of due process of law.
Today’s Supreme Court, however, must interpret the First
Amendment in a world quite different from the one known by the
Framers. As Justice William J. Brennan noted in 1963,
[The] religious composition [of the United States] makes us a vastly
more diverse people than were our forefathers. They knew differ-
ences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more
heterogeneous religiously. . . .
 In the face of such profound changes,
practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time
of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many
persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.
50
Thirty-six years later, the nation’s religious diversity is even richer,
and the potential interaction between government and religion even
more extensive. Though blatant governmental regulation of religion
is unlikely today, the complex network of state and federal laws still
carries great potential for adversely affecting religious exercise or
preferring some religions or religion generally.
Interpreting the First Amendment has proved vexing for courts,
legislatures, and commentators. Especially problematic is the relation
between the commitment to guard against government establishment
of religion and the guarantee to protect individuals’ freedom to exer-
cise religion.
 Do the two clauses of the amendment have independent
meaning, or do they modify one another? Restrictions on establishing
religion could easily collide with assurances permitting the free exer-
cise of religion. If a state cannot close schools and businesses on Sun-
days or Good Friday for fear of establishing Christianity as an official
or preferred religion, that prohibition burdens individuals’ abilities to
observe their Sabbath and their holy days. If the state cannot exempt
a synagogue from municipal historic preservation codes, then public
rules may infringe on a religious group’s self-government. If a public
school denies funding and space to an Islamic student group while
granting resources to a stress-reduction meditation group, it prefers
one group while burdening another. If the state accommodates the
free exercise needs of a student enrolled in a public school by creat-
ing a prayer rug room, it may risk advancing Islam over other relig-
ions. How should such collisions be treated under the law? Does the
ban against establishment guard against government preference for
50.I d .  at 240-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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any one religion, or for religion per se, as opposed to the secular?
These questions remain open in contemporary jurisprudence, with
clues provided only in the particular judgments of the courts. Simple
guides or tests either fail to answer hard questions or else prove ma-
nipulable and unpredictable. Alternatives proposed by individual
Justices and scholars fail to secure widespread support or to decide
hard cases.
51 In the areas of schooling and assistance to the poor, free
exercise and establishment issues often arise together and require
joint consideration.
Predicting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion
clauses is especially difficult at this moment.
 Nonetheless, I engage in
prediction.
  I also offer my own view about potential challenges to
public subsidies for private religious schooling and governmental
partnerships with private religious groups in the provision of welfare
assistance, with a focus on the “charitable choice” provision of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996.
52
51. Phillip Kurland urges a position of strict neutrality, through which the government
would use only secular criteria and would not undertake to accommodate religion. See Phillip J.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961). Yet, this
approach neglects the Free Exercise Clause. Laurence Tribe maintains that the two clauses ad-
vance voluntarism and separatism, see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1160-61 (2d ed. 1988), but the Supreme Court’s decisions do not precisely fit these notions, see
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1540-43 (3d ed. 1996) (describing the
varying approaches the Supreme Court has taken to interpreting the religion clauses). Justice
O’Connor has urged a notion of “no endorsement” to guide the application of the Establish-
ment Clause. See, e.g., Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 750, 772-84
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Es-
tablishment Clause should operate primarily to prevent government from endorsing a particu-
lar religion). Her idea, however, has received only limited support from the Court, with differ-
ent Justices at times lining up behind it and at times against it. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra, at
1566-67 (discussing the “shifting” character of the majority that appears to endorse Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573 (1989)). Furthermore, assessing what counts as a state endorsement of religion will
vary with the perceptions of members of different groups. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 62-63 (1990) (suggesting that
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is hindered by the fact that it would be nearly impossible
to find a truly objective observer who could neutrally determine whether a state action gave the
appearance of endorsing religion). Lawrence Sager and Christopher Eisgruber have developed
a coherent conception of the fundamental commitment to equal regard of all individuals behind
the religion clauses, see, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Re-
ligious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 600-12 (1996), but to date this view has not attracted the
support of the courts.
52. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
604(a)) (providing a mechanism by which states can contract with both secular and religious
private organizations to provide social services).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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A. Doctrinal Framework
Despite its common use, the phrase “separation of church and
state” neither appears in the First Amendment
53 nor adequately
summarizes the complex case law implementing the ban against gov-
ernmental establishment of religion and the guarantee of religious
free exercise. The much-battered doctrinal test for dealing with the
governmental establishment of religion, developed by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurztman,
54 concedes that absolute separation be-
tween state and religious entities is not the goal of the First Amend-
ment.
55 The doctrinal test set forth by the Lemon Court considers: (1)
whether the law or governmental action under question has a secular
purpose; (2) whether the primary effects of law or government action
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) whether the law or government
action excessively entangles the government with religion.
56 Note how
this last prong admits that entanglement of some sort is not only
permitted but expected.
However, Lemon has not supplied the basis for rejecting a law in
over ten years,
57 and at least five members of the Court think it
53. Thomas Jefferson is usually cited as the author of the notion that the First Amendment
was intended to create “‘a wall of separation between church and State.’” Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The
Court itself has reasoned that total separation is not required, nor even possible. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984) (“[A]s this Court has so often noted, total separation of
[church and state] is not possible.”); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) (“It has never been thought either possible or desirable to en-
force a regime of total separation [of church and state] . . . .); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971) (“Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense.”).
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
55. See id. at 614. Other thoughtful observers have noted the problems inherent in the idea
of absolute separation. See, e.g., RONALD  F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC  LIFE: A
DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 42-66 (1996) (describing the idea of the separation of church and
state as a “misleading metaphor”); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Re-
ligious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 837 (1995) (arguing that separation of church and state is sometimes an analyti-
cal and practical impossibility).
56.S e e  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
57. Many scholars have commented on the Court’s tendency to ignore Lemon. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Post-
modern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 51 n.6 (1999) (describing
Lemon as “roundly criticized and ignored in later [Supreme Court] opinions”); William P.
Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Free-
dom in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 543 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court seemed to
disregard Lemon completely in deciding Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)); Mardi L. Blis-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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should be replaced.
58 The trend, if anything, is toward less stringent
demands for separation of church and state than Lemon implied.
59
For example, the Court in 1997 upheld the use of federal categorical
funds to provide services on the site of a religious school to children
otherwise eligible for federal services; this decision was a reversal of
two prior Supreme Court decisions.
60 The Court has not yet, however,
rejected the Lemon test, nor has it approved an alternative single
doctrinal framework. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has proposed an
alternative inquiry into whether the state’s action could be viewed
sard, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993): An Answered
Prayer to Students with Disabilities in Religious Schools, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 449,
472-73 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court largely ignored Lemon in deciding Zobrest);
Paula Savage Cohen, Comment, Psycho-Coercion, A New Establishment Clause Test: Lee v.
Weisman and Its Initial Effect, 73 B.U. L. REV. 501, 501 (1993) (arguing the same about the
Weisman decision); Shanin Revai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in
Establishment Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 519-20 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court
applies  Lemon inconsistently and occasionally seems to ignore it outright). State supreme
courts finds themselves operating in the context of a reviewing court that has neither applied
Lemon nor overruled it. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d 1272, 1286 (Wash. 1997)
(noting that the Supreme Court has declined to apply the Lemon test in recent cases, but hold-
ing that Lemon must still control Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Washington until the
Supreme Court expressly overrules it).
58. Four Justices on the current Court have authored concurring or dissenting opinions
calling for the rejection of the Lemon test, and a fifth, Justice Thomas, has joined in one of
these opinions. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
399-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Even the most stringent effort in that direction would have to engage the government
in defining what counts and what does not count as religion. In the meantime, four of the cur-
rent Supreme Court Justices have expressly called for replacing the Lemon test with an analysis
that would be less hostile to government connections with religion. See, e.g., id. (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (proposing that the Lemon test be abandoned and listing opinions by four other cur-
rent Justices who have, at one time or another, advocated doing so); County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Lemon test is unduly hostile toward religion and
should not be used as the primary guide for Establishment Clause jurisprudence). In recent
opinions, some Justices invoke Lemon; others seek to replace it; and Justice O’Connor resists
the notion of any “grand unified theories” in which bedrock principles collide. See Rosenberger
v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
Establishment Clause jurisprudence cannot be reduced to a single test). Yet, Justice O’Connor
has led the Court toward another test for analyzing Establishment Clause claims, arguing that
the Court should inquire into whether the government’s action would be viewed by an objec-
tive observer as an endorsement of religion or of a particular religion. See, e.g., Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773-78 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(advocating an endorsement test as an alternative to the plurality’s free speech analysis of the
constitutionality of a holiday display on state property).
60.S e e  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215-36 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1986), and, in relevant part, School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1986)).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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objectively as an endorsement of religion.
61 Others emphasize the
Constitution’s purpose in preventing social or political division based
on religious differences,
62 or in ensuring governmental neutrality to-
ward religion.
63 Each of these approaches suggests more leniency to-
ward what some might view as establishment problems.
Regarding the free exercise of religion, the Court’s trend has
been to reject challenges framed as burdens on the free exercise
rights of minority religious groups and generally to shield govern-
ment action that is couched in a general form.
64 At the same time, the
Court has relaxed previous restrictions on public funding where re-
ligious adherents seek public benefits available to others, in the name
of preventing discrimination on the basis of religion.
65 Several Justices
61.S e e  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (labeling her
analysis an as “endorsement test” and asking whether the government has a purpose to endorse
religion and whether the challenged statute conveys a message of state endorsement of relig-
ion). Richard Fallon notes that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test could lead to constitu-
tional objection to voucher plans, although her opinion in Agostini did not allude to endorse-
ment concerns and leaves open the possibility of approval of voucher plans. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 124 n.417 (1997).
62.S e e  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988) (plurality) (holding that one purpose
of the Establishment Clause is to limit government aid to “pervasively sectarian” religious or-
ganizations). In contrast, Lawrence Sager and Christopher Eisgrouper urge folding the religion
clauses into a general constitutional commitment to equal regard. See Christopher L. Eisgruber
& Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1282-1314 (1994). Sager further argues that this
approach would protect members of religious minorities from discrimination, require publicly
accessible reasons for defense of public programs, and also guard government actions of a gen-
eral nature against challenges for burdening the exercise of religion. See Contemporary Chal-
lenges Facing the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 115-22 (1999)
(remarks of Lawrence Sager).
63.S e e  Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 20-42 (1997) (arguing that a government pol-
icy of neutrality toward religion would encourage faith-based social service providers to better
coordinate efforts with existing government programs). For a critique of this view as inade-
quately attentive to separationist concerns, see Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
64.S e e  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that, in some cases, the gov-
ernment may accommodate the free exercise of religion, so long as its actions do not tend to
coerce anyone into supporting or participating in religious activity); County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 613-21 (1989) (plurality) (finding a state holiday
display that included a Christmas tree and a menorah to be a permissible secular expression,
and rejecting the argument that such a display impaired the free exercise rights of those who
were neither Christian nor Jewish); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990) (finding the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by government requirements that are
generally applicable, such as general criminal prohibitions).
65.S e e  Bowen, 487 U.S. at 600-18 (affirming the constitutionality of a congressional act
establishing a government program to provide funding to both religious and nonreligiousMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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make central to religion clause challenges an assessment of the po-
tential coercion of the individual in the realm of religious belief or
practice.
66 Reaching conclusions on diverse grounds in particular
cases, the Court seeks to steer a path between forbidden governmen-
tal establishment of religion and outlawed curbs on individuals’ free
exercise. More probative than any simple verbal formulation of the
guiding principles for judgment are the actual actions taken by the
Court in recent years. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,
67
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute granting churches
and schools the power to veto the grant of liquor licenses to restau-
rants within five hundred feet of church or school buildings.
68 In a
more tortured opinion in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Gru-
met,
69 the Court forbade New York from drawing school district lines
to encompass only members of a particular religious group.
70 Thus,
one line of analysis asks whether the government has delegated a
public function to a religious group. Granting churches vetoes over
liquor licenses to nearby restaurants and creating a special school dis-
trict for a religiously identified community cross into this forbidden
zone.
In the context of public schools and aid to private schools, no dis-
cernible pattern has appeared in the Supreme Court’s decisions af-
fecting public financial support for activities related to private paro-
chial schooling.
 A particular tangle of cases approved some kinds of
tax assistance and reimbursements for parochial school tuition but
disapproved of others.
71 These cases suggest that universally available
groups for services and research related to adolescent sexual relations).
66. For example, the plurality opinion in Weisman, written by Justice Kennedy, found that
prayers offered during a public school graduation amount to an Establishment Clause violation
because of the risk of religious coercion. See  Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593 (plurality). Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Lyng v. Northeast Indian Cemetary Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988), considered the potential coercion of individuals in the course of analyzing a free
exercise challenge. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. For a discussion of the plurality view in Weisman,
see Elizabeth B. Brandy, Lee v. Weisman: A New Age for Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?,
23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 535, 558-62 (1993). Free exercise of religion may be burdened
even by indirect coercion, see Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450, but there may be no constitutional viola-
tion if the government’s requirements are generally applicable, as with a general criminal pro-
hibition, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
67. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
68. See id. at 117.
69. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
70. See id. at 696.
71. Thus, the Court has summarily affirmed several cases in which lower courts rejected
tax credits or deductions to assist parents whose children attend nonpublic schools. See PublicMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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assistance, including aid to families using religious schools, have a
greater chance of surviving challenges.
 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has found that programs neutrally providing governmental assistance
to a broad spectrum of citizens are more acceptable than programs
assisting only some parents, or only parents pursuing sectarian
schools.
72 Thus, public subsidies for textbooks used by students, re-
gardless of their attendance at public or private schools, have been
ruled constitutional.
73 Also passing constitutional muster is the use of
public funds to support transportation of children to parochial
schools.
74 Public employees can provide remedial instruction and
counseling to students on the site of parochial schools.
75 Yet, a state
cannot supplement the salaries of teachers at nonpublic schools to
approximate the salaries of public school teachers.
76
Funds for Pub. Sch. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.) (holding the same for an educational de-
duction from state tax), aff’d mem. sub nom. Beggans v. Public Funds for Pub. Sch., 442 U.S.
907 (1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (finding unconstitutional a
state educational tax credit that was found to benefit primarily students attending private sec-
tarian religious schools), aff’d mem. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). In a full
opinion, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a New York state tuition grant and tax
benefit program for low-income parents because the program operated primarily to subsidize
private sectarian religious schools. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). The Court dismissed arguments that the statute was constitutional because grants were
delivered to parents rather than to schools, emphasizing that “the fact that aid is disbursed to
parents rather than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered [in evalu-
ating the constitutionality of a state law].” Id. at 781. As indicated by my analysis below, I think
that the current Court would give greater weight to this one factor. For example, in a subse-
quent case, the Court approved a state provision allowing parents to deduct from their state
income taxes certain expenses relating to transportation, tuition, and textbooks in support of
their children’s schooling. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393-405 (1983). The Court did
note that the Mueller statute was “vitally different from the scheme struck down in Nyquist,” id.
at 399, in that the tax deduction in question was available to all parents, not just those whose
children were attending private schools, see id. at 397-99.
72. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-99; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775-76.
73.S e e  Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238 (1977) (approving public funding for text-
books, testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic services in nonpublic schools,
but striking down public funding for instructional materials and field-trip services); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (upholding a textbook loan program to nonpublic schools,
as it “‘merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge.’” (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968))).
74.S e e  Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state. The wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.”).
75.S e e  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997). Agostini overruled the Supreme
Court’s earlier decisions of Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School District v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
76.S e e  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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The Supreme Court has moved toward permitting state financial
assistance to students in parochial schools.
  In addition, the Court
treats the private choice of parents and students as an act that severs
any prohibited connection between the public funds and the religious
institution.
 Thus, the Court recently ruled that a state can pay a blind
student’s tuition at a sectarian theological institution through gener-
ally applicable financial aid programs, because the public funds are
paid directly to the student, who then transmits them to the educa-
tional institution of his choice.
77 Similarly, a state may allow taxpayers
to deduct from their state income taxes certain expenses incurred in
providing education for their children, despite objections that this
provision has the effect of advancing the sectarian aims of nonpublic
schools.
78 Federal funds to assist students with disabilities, students
from low-income communities, and students identified as presenting
special risks of school failure may be used on the site of religious
schools when they are distributed through a public agency to the eli-
gible students, regardless of where the students choose to attend
school.
79 Public provision of a sign language interpreter in a perva-
sively sectarian school does not violate the Establishment Clause.
80
Apparently, the parents’ choice of a religious school should not de-
prive the student of services available to public school students. Ad-
ditionally, monies generally available to support student speech on
77. See Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)
(“Any aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately flows to religious institutions
does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”). In
Witters, the Court drew an explicit distinction between that case and Ball: “[W]here . . . no
meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, ‘the con-
cept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction.’” Id. at 487 n.4 (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at
396). The Court recently restated and reaffirmed this view of the case in explaining that “any
money that ultimately went to religious institutions did so ‘only as a result of the genuinely in-
dependent and private choices of’ individuals.” Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (quoting Witters, 474
U.S. at 487).
78. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983) (finding no Establishment Clause viola-
tion in a state law allowing income tax deductions for educational expenses including tuition,
textbooks, school supplies, and transportation for parents whose children attend elementary or
secondary school).
79. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (holding that the Es-
tablishment Clause does not prohibit a school district from providing a sign language inter-
preter for a deaf student attending a Roman Catholic high school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 482
(finding no state endorsement of religion in extending assistance to a blind person studying at a
Christian college, even if the student is pursuing a career in ministry). Notably, the Court did
not use the Lemon test in the Zobrest decision.
80. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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the campus of public universities must be available to support relig-
ious speech.
81
Though a certain program may be constitutional on its face, the
actual implementation of the program may violate the Constitution.
This allows the Court to distinguish facial challenges to programs
permitting the use of public funds in religious organizations from “as-
applied” challenges to the actual operation of such programs. In Bo-
wen v. Kendrick,
82 for example, the Court rejected a facial challenge
to statutory authorization for federal grants to public and private or-
ganizations, including religious ones, to assist counseling and research
in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations.
83 The Court
nonetheless remanded the case for a factual finding about the actual
uses of the monies and indicated that the grants might be unconstitu-
tional if the funds assisted “pervasively sectarian” institutions or paid
for “‘specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secu-
lar setting.’”
84 Thus, the Court acknowledged that constitutional vio-
lations can arise with particular uses of public dollars to support re-
ligious institutions, even though it generally permits religious entities
to participate in universally available grant programs. Perhaps, in the
Court’s view, the dangers of intergroup conflict seem more remote
when religious groups are allowed to participate in universally avail-
able grant programs than when they are excluded from them.
B. Applications
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that gov-
ernment programs using public funds to pay religious school tuitions
will be upheld as constitutional, while government efforts to share or
to turn over responsibilities in the welfare area to religious entities
may be unconstitutional. The following discussion offers some words
of prediction and recommendation regarding both school and welfare
vouchers.
81. See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995). The Court
emphasized that the funds at issue came from a student activity fee, not from a general tax, and
refrained from extending its analysis to expenditure from a general tax fund. See id. at 840-41.
82. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
83.I d .  at 593; see also id. at 617 (“[T]he statute has a valid secular purpose, does not have
the primary effect of advancing religion, and does not create an excessive entanglement of
church and state.”).
84.I d . at 613 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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1. School-Choice Programs.
85 Like tax deductions for school
tuition and expenses, tax breaks on education savings plans, and
publicly funded scholarships, school vouchers divert public funds to
private schools.
86 Because the vast majority of private schools are
religiously affiliated, these programs may create impermissible
entanglements between religion and the state.
87 Three cases recently
considered by state courts highlight this issue. The Cleveland City
School District case arose when a federal district court in the city
found the quality of the public schools so poor that it ordered the
85. School-choice programs that restrict vouchers for use in nonreligious schools do not
raise problems under the Establishment Clause, but they can be challenged as interfering with
the free exercise of religion by those parents who wish to elect parochial schools. Thus far, such
challenges have had more success in law reviews than in the courts. Compare Michael McCon-
nell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989,
1014-22 (1991) (arguing that the government cannot penalize the exercise of constitutional
rights and explaining that “[b]y exercising their constitutional right to introduce a religious
element into their child’s education at their own expense, a family forfeits their entitlement to
the largest and most important benefit provided by the state for its people”), and  Michael
McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic
Control of Schooling, Presentation to the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophers
(Dec. 1998) (forthcoming in NOMOS) [hereinafter McConnell, Education Disestablishment]
(arguing that exclusion of religious schools from choice programs violates the Free Exercise
Clause), with Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 728 A.2d 127, 135 (Me. 1999) (finding no free
exercise violation in the exclusion of religious schools from a choice program), and Chittenden
Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., No. 97-275, 1999 WL 378244 (Vt. June 11, 1999)
(rejecting a claim that the denial of public funds for use at parochial schools would contravene
individuals’ right to the free exercise of religion). School-choice programs such as magnet and
charter school programs expand choice among public schools and do not seem to impinge upon
the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
  86. Of course, it is a matter of some dispute whether tax deductions and tax credits
amount to public funds or merely to the preservation of private funds. However, in a strict eco-
nomic sense, they deduct monies that otherwise would be collected and put into the public fisc.
See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1989) (plurality) (holding that an exclu-
sive exemption for religious publications from sales and usage tax lacks sufficient breadth to
pass “Establishment scrutiny”). Taking the private funds perspective, some commentators have
argued that parents who send their children to parochial schools are unfairly forced to pay tui-
tion twice—once through taxes that support only public schools, and once in tuition paid di-
rectly to the parochial schools. The central defect in this argument is that not only parents of
school-aged children are taxed to support public schools. Public schools are a public good, and
all taxpayers therefore invest in the education of the next generation on the premise that the
results will make everyone better off. A contrasting and more powerful argument can be made
that provision of a voucher program that covers private but not religious schools risks invidious
discrimination against those who would choose religious schools.
  87. See, e.g., Green, supra note 12, at 57-73 (describing potential Establishment Clause
problems); Walter McCann & Judith Areen, Vouchers and the Citizen—Some Legal Questions,
in EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 117-24 (George R. LaNoue
ed., 1972) (same).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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state to take them over.
88 In response, the state initiated a scholarship
program to permit students to attend neighboring public schools and
registered private schools.
89 Some eighty percent of the private
schools registered for the 1996-97 school year were sectarian; no
neighboring public school districts participated.
90 A taxpayer group
filed suit alleging that the program violated both the federal and state
constitutions, and the state court of appeals agreed.
91 The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the school voucher program did
not violate the Establishment Clause, except where selection criteria
gave priority to students whose parents belonged to the religious
group supporting the sectarian school.
92 Finding these selection
criteria severable from the statutory scheme, the court rejected the
remaining federal constitutional challenges,
93 while at the same time
ruling that the statute violated the “one subject per statute”
requirement in the state constitution.
94 This technical problem was
fixed by the legislature in early 1999.
95 On August 25, 1999, a federal
district court enjoined the voucher program on Establishment Clause
grounds.
96 After waves of public concern over halting a school
program just as the school year was starting, the district court stayed
its order as to already-enrolled students.
97
  The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, initiated in Wisconsin
in 1989, was amended in 1995 to allow up to fifteen percent of the
low-income students in that city’s public system to attend private
schools, including religious schools.
98 In 1995, eighty-nine of the 122
private schools eligible for the program were sectarian.
99 A state trial
88.S e e  Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
  89. In 1996-97, scholarship recipients received 90% of tuition costs, up to a maximum of
$2500. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
  92. See Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 210.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 210-16.
95. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
96. See id. at 741; see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Judge Blocks School Voucher Program in
Ohio, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1999, at B2.
97.S e e  Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, Nos. 1:99 CV 1740, 1:99 CV 1818, 1999 WL 669222, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 1999).
98.S e e  Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
In order to participate in the program, the private schools must agree to follow guidelines pro-
hibiting discrimination and promoting health and safety. See id.
99. See id. at 619 n.17.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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court enjoined the plan’s implementation on Establishment Clause
grounds, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the program even though religious schools are the likely
beneficiary of most of the public funds.
100 The United States Supreme
Court later declined to review this decision,
101 appearing to signal a
green light to such experiments at the state level without giving ex-
plicit federal constitutional approval.
102
  In Vermont, the town of Chittenden authorized the payment of
private school tuitions for its resident children in 1995, since the town
did not have its own high school.
103 The Vermont Department of
Education, however, disapproved of the town’s plan to pay tuition to
a nearby Catholic academy and threatened to deny Chittenden all
educational funding.
104 The Vermont Supreme Court, declining to use
an Establishment Clause rationale, ruled that the town’s plan vio-
lated the “compelled support” clause of the state constitution, which
forbids state support of religious worship.
105
100. See id.
101.S e e  Jackson v. Benson, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
  102. The Wisconsin court reasoned that there was a secular purpose of advancing parental
choices in education without entangling the government in religious schools themselves. See
Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620. It also concluded that the primary effect of the program was not to
benefit religious schools but instead to enhance genuinely independent and private parental
choices. See id. at 617-19. Critics of the opinion charge that the Wisconsin court neglected fed-
eral precedents forbidding foreseeable financial support for private religious institutions and
banning governmental endorsement of religious means where secular means would suffice. See
Case Comment, Establishment Clause—School Vouchers—Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 112 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1999) (disagreeing with the
court’s decision to uphold the choice program because it ignored precedent and allowed an
“entanglement” of church and state by enabling religious schools to become dependent on the
government).
103.S e e  Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., No. 97-275, 1999 WL
378244 (Vt. June 11, 1999).
  104. See id.
  105.S e e  id. The state constitution’s chapter I, article 3 provides:
That all persons have a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty God, ac-
cording to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings, as in their opin-
ions shall be regulated by the word of God; and that no person ought to, or of right
can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of
worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of conscience, nor can any
person be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of re-
ligious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can,
or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case
interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise
of religious worship.
VT. CONST. ch. I., art. 3. The analysis in the text of this Article addresses the federal Constitu-
tion. State bans against the flow of public dollars into religious entities may prove a greater ob-
stacle to voucher programs that include religious schools (or to arguments that such schoolsMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
522 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:493
  Given this history, I predict that the courts will assess constitu-
tional challenges to school choice by looking to the chain of deci-
sionmaking afforded under the program.
106 If the actual decision
about where to spend the governmental money is given to private ac-
tors, such as parents and students, these programs can plausibly be
understood as enhancing private choices in education rather than es-
tablishing religion through governmental means. This characteriza-
tion would seem to satisfy the Lemon test: the purpose of promoting
parental choice to improve education is a secular one, the primary ef-
fect arguably is to enhance competition and therefore overall educa-
tional quality,
107 and entanglement between church and state can be
minimized if funds pass from the state, to parents, to private schools.
Moreover, if these opportunities for school choice are afforded to all
parents and students, it could not be said that the government was fa-
voring only certain groups.
108 The legal system comfortably adopts
this view about parents in other contexts. For example, a parent’s de-
cision to refuse medical treatment for a hospitalized child does not
trigger any liability on the hospital because the treatment decision is
made by the parents.
  Indeed, if a state institutes a school voucher program allowing
private selection of private schools, the program may be required to
extend to religious schools. Otherwise, those who prefer religious
schools could plausibly claim discrimination in public programs,
amounting to a burden on their free exercise of religion or a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
109 Crucial to sustaining such claims,
must be eligible for vouchers). Yet, the federal equal protection guarantee remains a further
resource for those worried about the exclusion of religious schools from voucher programs.
  106. The Court’s majority stated in Mueller: “It is noteworthy that all but one of our recent
cases invalidating state aid to parochial schools have involved the direct transmission of assis-
tance from the state to the schools themselves.” Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983). The
one exception was Nyquist, which the Court distinguished on the ground that the benefits were
available only to parents of children in nonpublic schools. See id. at 398.
  107. Note that a serious problem could emerge under the effects prong of the test if all or
even most of the vouchers were used in one parochial school or system. See infra notes 112-14
and accompanying text (discussing nonfacial challenges).
  108.S e e  Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398 (approving a tax deduction for educational expenses, in
part because of its availability to “all parents”).
  109. Some challengers may oppose any voucher or tax plan that assists only those who elect
private schools, rather than equally assisting those in public and private schools. They would
point to the Court’s emphasis on this factor in approving the tax deduction scheme in Mueller.
See id. It would indeed be a new step for the Court to approve a voucher or tax relief provision
that did not afford benefits equally to parents who select public schools and parents who pick
private schools for their children. However, I do not think that this step can be opposed suc-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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though, is the retention of public and nonsectarian schools as alterna-
tives. The very success of parochial schools no doubt has something
to do with their ability to select and to exclude;
110 the constitutionality
of voucher plans that include such schools depends on the presence
of genuine alternatives.
111
  The constitutional challenge most likely to succeed would attack
the way in which a school voucher program is applied, not designed.
If all or most of the vouchers were used to select religious schools,
especially if those religious schools were largely or exclusively of a
single denomination, the voucher program might raise concerns
similar to those the Supreme Court addressed in Bowen v. Ken-
drick.
112 Discerning such effects would require a factual finding about
the actual operations of the scheme. However, mere disparities be-
tween the number of religious schools receiving vouchers and the
number of secular private schools receiving vouchers would not con-
vince the Supreme Court that an Establishment Clause problem ex-
isted. Indeed, the Court has held that any unequal effect of a public
program assisting private school choice “can fairly be regarded as a
rough return for the benefits . . . provided to the state and all taxpay-
cessfully by asserting that parents who send their children to public school get the direct benefit
of their tax contributions to those schools, while parents who send their children to private
schools do not. This consumer conception of taxation misconstrues the nature and purpose of
public support of schools, for even adults who have no children of school age must pay such
taxes. They support the public good of developing an educated populace. In the meantime, the
line of cases decided by the Court since Mueller, described above, suggests the growing solici-
tude of the Court toward not just private educational choices, but also religious ones. See supra
notes 71-81 and accompanying text. Moreover, at a sufficient level of generality, private school
vouchers and tax relief programs can be viewed as benefiting all parents—for all parents poten-
tially could opt for private schools. In addition, the Court reasoned in Mueller that any dispa-
rate benefit flowing to parochial schools can be regarded as a return for the benefits provided
to the state and to taxpayers from the parochial school option. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402.
110.S e e  Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 823 n.31 (1992) (noting that private schools can exclude disrup-
tive students by means of their selection processes); Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State Con-
stitutional Restraints on Privatization of Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381, 387 (1992) (observing
that private schools may exclude students through suspensions or expulsions without observing
the due process restraints imposed on public schools). Private schools may not discriminate on
the basis of race, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981
to private schools), but they may discriminate on other factors, such as economic class. With
the exception of limited scholarship programs, private schools largely restrict themselves to
students with the ability to pay tuition.
  111.S e e  Isaac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, Can the Churches Save the Cities?: Faith-
Based Services and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 47; see also Minow,
Reforming School Reform, supra note 3.
112. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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ers by parents sending their children to parochial schools.”
113 In so
doing, the Court emphasized that it “would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual re-
ports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law.”
114 So long as a public, nonreligious
option remains available, providing school vouchers to help pay for
religious school tuitions seems compatible with the emerging Court
treatment of religion.
  Alternatively, a constitutional analysis quite different from the
conventional practice of courts and commentators could pose a pro-
found challenge to vouchers and tax relief assisting private school
choice. Conventional constitutional interpretation, combining evi-
dence of the intentions of the drafters of the First Amendment and
analogies to prior Supreme Court interpretations of the Amend-
ment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, forbids schemes
giving public dollars to parents to elect from among a range of public
and private schooling options. However, neither of these sources
provides a convincing basis for rejecting public financial support for
parental choice over schooling, given the Framers’ commitment to
education as a means for developing children’s capacities to know the
Bible,
115 as well as the pattern of Supreme Court precedents I have
just described. An alternative constitutional interpretation would in-
stead ask whether a set of social changes could so alter the assump-
tions underlying the context in which the Constitution operates as to
place its premises in jeopardy.
116 Under this untried method of inter-
  113. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402.
  114.I d . at 401; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229 (1997) (“Nor are we willing to
conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian
school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid.”).
115.S e e  JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE SEPARATION ILLUSION: A LAWYER EXAMINES THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 88 (1977) (observing that the Framers of the First Amendment intended to
“leave the states a free hand in religion—free to establish their churches, free to permit Bible
reading and prayer in the schools”). The Framers no doubt followed the colonial conception of
schools as vehicles for preserving both religious faith and existing economic and social hierar-
chies. See MERLE CURTI, THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS 4-5, 10, 16 (1974). Of
course, the relationship between the states and the federal Constitution has changed pro-
foundly since the Civil War and the New Deal.
116. Many constitutional scholars have argued that constitutional interpretation is inevita-
bly affected by events occurring long after the Constitution’s adoption.  See, e.g., 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity
and Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). For aMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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pretation, television might warrant a reconsideration of what consti-
tutes constitutional speech and political campaign practices; cyber-
space might require reevaluation of property and jurisdictional rules;
and the diversion of public dollars from public to private schools
might require reassessment of the preconditions for a committed, tol-
erant, and equal citizenry.
117 Calling for a kind of holistic assessment
of the Constitution’s guarantees and preconditions, this mode of in-
terpretation would also elevate facts about social change. Neverthe-
less, no such constitutional interpretation currently guides any court,
and it is not my purpose here to propound and defend this alternative
approach.
  Absent such an analysis, we are left with debates over policy.
First, would the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs fa-
cilitate or undermine the important goal of preparing each successive
generation for democratic self-governance, as well as fostering the
requisite qualities of tolerance, civic duty, and social cooperation?
Many people think that the nation has much to benefit from private
parochial schools and experiments enabling more parents to opt for
them.
118 For example, a recent book argues that Catholic schools are
more successful at fostering human cooperation than public schools,
though public schools often were founded for that very purpose.
119
This may occur because Catholic schools are devoted to the purpose
of promoting human cooperation for the common good and ground
their work in a moral base with experienced teachers, communal or-
ganization, and a capacity to engage teachers and students.
120 Yet,
thoughtful overview of the dimensions of selecting a constitutional theory—and the unavoid-
able role of factors external to the Constitution—see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a
Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999). On occasion, scholars call for reassessing
existing constitutional commitments in light of notable social, economic, or technological
changes. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra; see also J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
  117. Contrary to my own view, Michael McConnell challenges the premise that the com-
mon school, whether in the ideal or in practice, could ever serve this function. See McConnell,
Education Disestablishment, supra note 85. Either the school will assume some non-neutral
stance toward values (preferring, for example, Protestantism or secular humanism), or it will
avoid the task of inculcating values and thereby disserve society. See id.
  118.S e e  BRYK ET AL., supra note 37, at 343 (suggesting a reconsideration of the strict ex-
clusion of public support for religious schools after examining how other countries handle this
separation); CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3, at 206-19, 221-23, 225-29 (presenting a design of and
support for a choice system that would not “privatize” the nation’s schools, but rather would
create a “truly public system – and a democratic one”).
119. See BRYK ET AL., supra note 37, at 11, 327.
120. See id. However, cooperation and service are not the same as civic-mindedness. ForMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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even if we admire the accomplishments of parochial schools and their
capacity to produce both good standardized test results and students
imbued with a sense of purpose and coherent values, the mission of
schooling in a democracy calls for inculcating certain public norms
necessary to foster democracy.
121 Neutrality in message is neither pos-
sible nor desirable, but inculcation of the civic values of tolerance,
equality, liberty, and democracy is defensible in a nation committed
to and dependent upon these values. Schools that model these ideas
are more likely to inculcate these values than schools departing from
them. Such a model is best provided by the common public school,
the school system intended to afford children from all walks of life
equal opportunities and a shared experience,
122 even if a small per-
centage of families exercise their constitutionally protected right to
elect religious or other private alternatives.
123 Regrettably, the goal of
the common school is a waning ideal, not a description of wide prac-
tice. Public schools across the country are marked by notable dispari-
ties in racial balance, and those disparities, sadly, track differences in
school quality. Disparities in the quality of instruction mark divisions
between white students and all others.
124 Social class and racial segre-
this reason, even private schools that cultivate a strong sense of collaboration and service do
not initiate students into the conception of civic engagement and dialogue modeled by the ideal
of public schools. See JOHN DEWEY, OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS 131 (Hil-
lary House, Inc. 1957) (1891) (arguing that education should take place in an atmosphere ena-
bling equal self-realization of each individual in the community); JOHN DEWEY & EVELYN
DEWEY, SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW 313-16 (1915) (arguing that the school itself should recon-
struct society and break down barriers between economic and social classes); John Dewey,
Philosophy and Education, in H IGHER  EDUCATION  FACES THE FUTURE 273, 282 (Paul A.
Schilpp ed., 1930) (arguing that education needs to remake social conditions).
121.S e e  A SSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM  DEVELOPMENT, ISSUES
ANALYSIS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CHOICE 9 (1990) (noting that the public good is created by
“common learnings such as citizenship, enculturation, and interpersonal relations in a plural-
istic society”); Robert B. Westbrook, Public Schooling and American Democracy,  in
DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND THE SCHOOLS 125, 131 (Roger Soder ed., 1996) (recognizing
that common schooling was designed to produce a shared experience among children of differ-
ent classes).
122.S e e  RICHARD PRATTE, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MOVEMENT 75-124 (1973) (examining
the origin, history, and ideology of the public school movement in America, as well as the eco-
nomic and social forces that are challenging it); DAVID  TYACK  & ELIZABETH  HANSOT,
MANGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 1820-1980, at 20-25 (1982)
(“In public schools . . . in nineteenth century America no sharp lines separated religion, citizen-
ship, and economic enterprise.”).
123.S e e  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a child is “not
a mere creature of the state” and that parents therefore have a right to direct the education of
their offspring).
124.S e e  GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSALMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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gation thus impair the ideal of the common school. The real or per-
ceived failure of so many public schools to afford genuine chances for
education, especially in large urban districts, makes the turn toward
competition in education a plausible, if not urgent, public policy de-
velopment.
125 Unfortunately, this very turn risks drawing so many
students away from the public schools that the common school ideal
will have no chance. An experiment should seek to strengthen, not to
destroy common public schools.
  This potential dilemma points to a second policy concern. Will in-
clusion of religious schools in voucher programs lead to such an exo-
dus of motivated parents and children that the prospects for improv-
ing public schools will disappear? The flip side of this question is
whether exclusion of religious schools from voucher programs will
trap many children in failing public schools, despite the chance for a
better education in neighboring religious schools. Resolving these
problems involves a difficult balancing of competing values, as well as
alternative views about what students and the nation need.
  Finally, there is the policy question of whether religious schools
indeed can better educate those who currently remain in substandard
or failing public schools. It would be an enormous mistake to think
that parochial schools or school-choice proposals can solve the prob-
lems of schooling for all of America’s children. It is impossible to dis-
entangle the success of parochial schools in retaining children from
at-risk backgrounds and in generating good test scores from both the
schools’ ability to exclude and expel troublesome students and the
involvement of the parents who select such schools.
126
  The belief that competition itself will elevate the quality of all
schools has yet to be demonstrated by any system that has adopted
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 359-61 (1996) (discussing how resegregation has spread
across the country). Overcoming education disadvantages for poor and minority children will
require multiple kinds of reform. See DAVID A. HAMBURG, TODAY’S CHILDREN: CREATING A
FUTURE FOR A GENERATION IN CRISIS 296-323 (1992).
  125. See, e.g., CARNEGIE  CORPORATION OF NEW  YORK, YEARS OF PROMISE: A
COMPREHENSIVE  LEARNING  STRATEGY FOR AMERICA’S  CHILDREN (1997); ERIC
HANUSCHEK ET AL., MAKING  SCHOOLS  WORK: IMPROVING  PERFORMANCE AND
CONTROLLING COSTS xvii-xviii (1994); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED STATES 52 (1993).
126.S e e  Arthur S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive Outcomes
in the Coleman Hoffer and Kilgore Report, 55 SOC. OF EDUC. 103, 103-22 (1982); Willms, supra
note 20, at 113 (comparing the growth in academic achievement of public- and Catholic-school
students and concluding that “policy decisions should not be based on the assumption that ei-
ther public or private schools produce better achievement outcomes”).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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charter or magnet schools. Increasingly, even those “public” choice
options will include schools run under contract by private, often un-
tested, management.
127 The deep problems of public education in
America ultimately are intertwined with longstanding, complex
problems in families and communities, and with skewed economic
opportunity structures. The immediate consequence of school-choice
programs will most likely leave the most vulnerable children from the
least-engaged and least-solid families in the worst schools.
128 The so-
lution of school choice—either inside public systems or crossing over
to private schools—is worth exploring, but only as one of many
strategies to improve the real opportunities for all children.
129
2.  “Charitable Choice.” The charitable choice provision of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996
130—more commonly known as the Welfare Reform Act, or “the
act ending welfare as we knew it”—is more vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge, but, in my view, it is less troubling on policy
grounds. The provision authorizes the states to pay religious agencies
directly for providing federally funded welfare services and to create
vouchers that enable individual aid recipients to receive welfare
services from a number of private nonprofit agencies approved by the
state.
131 By selecting religious agencies for these purposes, states may
127.S e e  Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schooling a Private Business, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 695, 695-96 & n.6 (1999) (“A market delivery approach, which displaces government con-
trol, has even extended an opportunity for profit-seeking enterprises to enter a realm tradition-
ally occupied by public and nonprofit providers.”).
128.S e e  Minow, Reforming School Reform, supra note 3, at 281 (“A choice system will
make the inequalities among parents directly cost children currently enrolled in public
schools.”).
129.S e e  id. at 42-45 (recommending that school reform include modification of existing op-
tions, such as charter schools).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. 1997).
131. See id. § 604a(a)(1). An additional feature of charitable choice may lead to a legal
challenge. Stanley Carlson-Thies notes, “All federal welfare funds block-granted to the states
must be expended in accordance with the charitable choice rules, even in states with constitu-
tional barriers to the expenditure of public funds by sectarian organizations.” Stanley W. Carl-
son-Thies, “Don’t Look to Us”: The Negative Responses of the Churches to Welfare Reform, 11
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 667, 672-73 (1997). This provision imposes the fed-
eral statute even upon states with contrary state constitutional provisions, and it could pose a
special problem if funds are commingled. Section 604a(k) tries to manage this conflict by not-
ing that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preempt any provision of a State consti-
tution or State statute that prohibits or restricts the expenditure of State funds in or by religious
organizations.” 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k). This provision covers state, but not federal, funds. Cur-
rently, at least 27 states prohibit taxpayers’ funds from going to any religious organization. SeeMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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not impair their religious expression or character.
132 At the same time,
the provision mandates that the religious freedom of the individual
voucher recipient not be diminished by the private provider.
133 The
approved institutions receive reimbursement from the state for each
aid recipient served.
134 Recently, Congress extended charitable choice
to Head Start and other federal social service programs.
135
Charitable choice received almost no discussion in Congress nor
in public and media debates, which were occupied with other features
of the welfare reform. The primary sponsor of charitable choice,
Senator John Ashcroft, has stated that the provision “is intended to
encourage faith-based service providers to cooperate with public wel-
fare programs by ensuring that they will not have to attenuate or
abandon their religious character or style of service.”
136 Elsewhere,
Senator Ashcroft applauded the provision as an effort to shift the set-
ting of social provision from secular, public offices to pervasively re-
Chris Collins, State Officials Will Soon Find Themselves Center in the Legal Debate over Roles
of Church, State, GANNETT  NEWS  SERVICE, Dec. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8843762.
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,
513 U.S. 959 (1994), suggests a willingness to impose the federal standard on a state with such a
ban.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b).
133. See id. § 604a(d)(1).
134. See id. § 604a(a)(1).
135.S e e  Community Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, Title I, § 201, 112 Stat. 2702, 2729 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9831-46). President Clinton apparently believes that the Act excludes pervasively
sectarian institutions, while Senator Ashcroft, its chief sponsor, has the opposite view. Compare
Statement of the President on Signing the Community Opportunities, Accountability, and
Training and Educational Services Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2148 (Nov. 2,
1998), with 144 CONG. REC. S12,686 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (dis-
agreeing about whether allowing “pervasively sectarian” organizations to receive Head Start
funds would be constitutional).
Ashcroft also seeks legislation to expand the charitable-choice concept to other social
services such as housing, juvenile services, and substance abuse programs. See Ashcroft Would
Expand ‘Charitable Choice’ to Help Needy Escape Poverty (Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://www.senate.gov/~ashcroft/2-3-99a.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Support
for charitable-choice provisions, permitting the use of federal funds in services provided by re-
ligious organizations, can be found among candidates for the presidency in both the Republican
and Democratic parties. See Joan Lowy, Gore Stuns Civil Libertarians (May 31, 1999)
<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/pn_gorechoice990531.html> (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (describing Vice President Gore’s support for charitable choice); ‘The
Duty of Hope’: Bush Outlines $8 Billion Charitable Plan (July 22, 1999)
<http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/bush_xscript990722.html> (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (reprinting Governor Bush’s speech, delivered in Texas, that outlines a
plan for an $8 billion program devolving federal social service programs on religious groups).
136. Carlson-Thies, supra note 131, at 672.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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ligious organizations.
137 Here, the provision proceeds in a spirit sug-
gested by Marvin Olasky, author of The Tragedy of American Com-
passion, who believes that religious groups do better than govern-
ment at meeting the needs of the poor, persons with substance abuse
problems, and teenagers at risk of pregnancy.
138 Olasky argues that
government-sponsored welfare undermines the spiritual and moral
capacities of individuals.
139 Spiritual renewal indeed can be as or more
important than meeting material need. Consequently, the provision
of care for the most vulnerable should not be passed through the cold
bureaucratic indifference of state-sponsored programs, but instead by
means of face-to-face exchanges within a moral community.
140 Ideally,
the provision of care by religious groups adds moral dimensions of
expected responsibility and hope, and it facilitates relationships
within which people can feel the pressure to change.
141 John Dilulio
puts forth a similar case regarding the provision of services for chil-
dren, emphasizing that children do not so much need services but in-
stead caring adults in their lives.
142
According to these views, religious organizations should not
merely cooperate with the government to provide child and welfare
services, but should serve to replace the government in the welfare
137.S e e  Ashcroft Applauds D.C.’s Use of Private Organizations in Making Welfare Work
(Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/~ashcroft/11-12-98.htm> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
138.S e e  OLASKY, supra note 27, at 204-09, 214-16, 224-25.
139. See id. at 205-08, 223-26, 231-33.
140. A philosopher far removed from the debate over charitable choice reminds us: “What-
ever is serious in religion, whatever is bound up with morality and fate, is contained in those
plain experiences of dependence and of affinity to that on which we depend.” GEORGE
SANTAYANA, LIFE OF REASON 30 (C. Scribner’s Sons 1933) (1905).
141. A more skeptical view would question whether the hierarchical, service orientations of
the religiously based providers can afford either respect or reciprocal relationships any better
than public bureaucracies. See Conversation with Richard Weissbourd, Lecturer, John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government, Harvard University, in Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 17, 1999).
Moreover, it is difficult, but important, to compare ideal versions of the one with the inevitably
inadequate practice versions of the other.
142.S e e  Jim Wallis, Criminologist John Dilulio Explains Why a God-Centered and Prob-
lem-Focused Approach Is Needed to Save Our Youth, SOJOURNERS MAG. (Sept.-Oct. 1997)
<http://www.sojourners.com/soj9709/970910.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In that
interview, he also argued:
The only good thing, in my view, that came out of the welfare reform bill was the
charitable choice section, which opened up a new possibility of public discourse and
dialogue between people who are God-centered and problem-centered and people
who may not be God-centered but are also problem-centered. That is where the faith
community needs to be in thinking about policy over the next 15 to 20 years.
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business. Governmental aid fails to move people from dependency,
and it may actually harm some recipients by causing self-defeating
behavior. Under this view, governmental aid itself leads people to
abandon their families, girls and women to become pregnant out of
wedlock, and families and communities to abandon those in trou-
ble.
143 Religious organizations can offer ongoing interactions to con-
nect dependent individuals with others who are independent. Not
only do these relationships provide care and attentive connection, but
they also offer models of the independence that can break the cycles
of dependency.
144 Evangelical social ministries offer examples for the
work contemplated by the Act.
145
Charitable choice represents a departure from previous govern-
mental arrangements with religious entities in a number of respects
that render it vulnerable to constitutional challenge: the inclusion of
pervasively sectarian institutions as recipients of public funds; the use
of vouchers to connect individuals with religious worship and prosely-
tizing in conjunction with social services; and the real risk that only
an identifiable subset of religious groups will participate. Each of
these features raises Establishment Clause concerns. The sheer fact
that destitute individuals who turn to the state for help are then di-
rected to religious providers could also raise free exercise problems,
for the participation of desperate people in religiously styled pro-
grams may cross the line into coercion.
a. Pervasively sectarian institutions. Prior to the charitable-
choice reform, states and localities often used federal funds to con-
tract with Catholic Charities USA, Methodist Ministries, Jewish
Charitable Federations, and other religious organizations in order to
provide child welfare services and other human services.
146 In the
143. Charles Murray is a prominent spokesman for the view that governmental aid pro-
duces such perverse incentives. See C HARLES A. MURRAY, SAFETY NETS AND THE TRULY
NEEDY: RETHINKING THE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM passim (1982).
144. In her view of the features of social programs that work, Lisbeth Schorr identifies a
“spiritual dimension” as one of the elements that fosters change in those seeking drug treat-
ment and other social services. See LISBETH B. SCHORR, COMMON PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING
FAMILIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS TO REBUILD AMERICA 15-17 (1997). She concludes “that it
may be easier to establish strong relationships in settings with a spiritual or religious foundation
than in secular settings, but faith-based auspices are not the only ones that can cultivate trans-
formative relationships.” Id. at 17. A compelling ethos, generated by a program such as City
Year, may supply a comparable sort of faith that assists innovative organizations. See id.
145.S e e  J IM  WALLIS, THE  SOUL OF POLITICS: BEYOND  “RELIGIOUS  RIGHT”  AND
“SECULAR LEFT” 204-09, 229-32 (1995) [hereinafter WALLIS, SOUL OF POLITICS] (describing
efforts within churches to provide spiritual and economic aid to their communities).
146.S e e  Father Brian Hehir, Comments at the Harvard Divinity School Seminar on Demo-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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past, these religiously affiliated organizations provided exclusively
secular services.
147 In contrast, charitable choice permits state con-
tracts not only with religiously affiliated service providers, but also
with pervasively sectarian institutions, including churches.
148 Indeed,
the statute explicitly directs that states cannot exclude religious or-
ganizations from voucher programs otherwise open to private pro-
viders.
149 A church itself, not merely its affiliated social service agency
down the street, can receive a state contract to provide services and
can be approved to accept vouchers from individuals eligible for
public services. The statute also protects the religious character of the
faith-based organization that obtains state contracts or receives
vouchers.
150 Thus, these organizations are permitted to maintain the
art, scripture, and other symbols associated with their religious or-
der.
151 They are also exempted from Title VII’s ban on religious dis-
crimination in hiring.
152 The program’s inclusion of pervasively relig-
ious organizations and the preservation of religious symbols link the
public funds and the religious realm more directly than past funding
of human services.
By extending public funds to pervasively religious institutions,
however, charitable choice may violate the Establishment Clause.
Permitting public funds to be used directly to support religious insti-
tutions and their messages may have the appearance of advancing re-
ligion in violation of the second prong of the Lemon test for analyz-
ing Establishment Clause challenges. Similarly, if the only local pro-
vider of services is a single religious organization in which prayer and
other religious activities pervade its every feature, this may advance
religion and present an excessive entanglement of religion in contra-
cratic Revival (Mar. 9, 1998).
147. See id.
148.S e e  42 U.S.C. § 604a(a) (Supp. 1997) (permitting state contracts with “religious organi-
zations”).
149. See id. § 604a(c).
150. See id. § 604a(d)(1)-(2). The Act also allows separate accounting procedures for fed-
eral funds and thereby shields the rest of the private organization’s financial records from pub-
lic review. See id. § 604a(h)(2).
151. See id. § 604a(d)(2).
152. See id. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-2; see also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) (approving Title VII’s exemption of religious organizations from the ban
against religious discrimination). Although not constitutionally required, the exemption pre-
vents potential violations of religious liberty. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36; see also Patty Ger-
stenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM.
U. L. REV. 513, 518 n.22 (1990) (detailing exemptions of religious organizations from otherwise
existing legal requirements).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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vention of the Lemon test. If the organization receives public funds
not by contract but instead through public vouchers, its status as the
only local provider could still raise establishment concerns.
153 Alter-
natively, these scenarios could also amount to a governmental en-
dorsement of religion, running afoul of Justice O’Connor’s test for
Establishment Clause challenges.
Although the pervasively religious character of participating enti-
ties is precisely what commends them to supporters of charitable
choice, this quality gives rise to an as-applied Establishment Clause
challenge as described by the Supreme Court in Bowen.
154  Such a
challenge would require a trial court to assess whether federal grants
flow to religiously affiliated institutions that are pervasively sectarian.
Perhaps today’s Court would not be so concerned with public funds’
flowing to pervasively sectarian institutions, but such a conclusion
would depart from prior decisions.
155
In addition, pervasively religious institutions project beliefs that
may depart from public values and that enjoy protection from public
regulation enforcing public values elsewhere. Particular religious
views about the proper roles of women, sexuality, nonmarital parent-
hood, and interracial intimacy potentially diverge from public com-
mitments to gender equality, privacy, and antidiscrimination on the
basis of marital status and race. In the course of receiving help from a
pervasively religious agency, an applicant for public assistance or so-
cial services may thus confront religious views and policies in direct
conflict with public norms. In effect, the use of the religious agency
for the delivery of services can supplant public values and erect re-
ligious ones in ways that could violate the prohibition against estab-
lishing religion or heavily burden individuals’ own freedoms of relig-
ious belief and practice.
153. It might also unduly burden the free exercise of individuals who feel that they have no
other place to turn. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing free exercise chal-
lenges).
154.S e e  487 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1988).
155. The separate opinions in Bowen offer some clues about the views of particular Justices.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, emphasized that the provision of funds
to a pervasively sectarian institution would not in itself constitute a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause: “The question in an as-applied challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious
character, but how it spends its grant.” Id. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In contrast, Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurring opinion announced that “any use of public funds to promote relig-
ious doctrines” would be unconstitutional. Id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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b. Government aid to worship and proselytizing. The voucher
option opens up avenues for federal aid to worship and proselytizing.
The statute specifies that “[n]o funds provided directly to institutions
or organizations to provide services and administer programs [under
charitable choice] shall be expended for sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization.”
156 The important word here is
“directly,” for it leaves open the possibility that individuals will use
vouchers to obtain services that include sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization.
157 Indeed, foreclosing these options
vitiates the very argument that religiously based social provision
holds special promise. Nevertheless, public dollars for such centrally
religious activities would appear to advance religion and excessively
entangle the state and federal governments with religion, as
prohibited by the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. Thus,
the individual who holds the voucher would be expected to pray as
part of the church program; the provider-agency staff could pray over
the recipient; or the recipient and staff could pray together. In each
instance, government dollars would be supporting prayer.
As in the earlier analysis of school vouchers, the intercession of
private choice could well immunize such expenditures from an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge.
158 The child whose parents use a
voucher to select a parochial school exercises a private choice and
does not thereby produce a governmental endorsement of religion.
Similarly, an individual recipient of a voucher for temporary financial
assistance who elects to redeem it at a local church expresses a per-
sonal, not a governmental, choice. The individual could then choose a
156. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j).
157. A Guide to Charitable Choice offers the following interpretation:
Q/May a state require that a faith-based organization attenuate or modify its relig-
ious convictions or religious style of providing services as a condition of participa-
tion?
A/No. The Charitable Choice provision explicitly provides that participating faith-
based organizations retain their right to control “the definition, development, prac-
tice, and expression” of their religious convictions. However, faith-based organiza-
tions may not require beneficiaries to actively participate in religious activities in or-
der to receive services. Further, faith-based providers may not use contract funds to
pay for worship services, sectarian instruction, or proselytization, so as to avoid the
appearance of governmental promotion of the provider’s religious doctrines. No such
restriction is necessary in the case of vouchers, where it is the beneficiary who selects
the service provider, not the government.
A Guide to Charitable Choice (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://cpjustice.org/Cguide/ccqanda.html#general> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
158. See id. (“Government here is not aiding religion. Rather, it is aiding beneficiaries by
means of nongovernmental organizations, some of which may be faith-based.”).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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program that includes, for example, prayer as part of the contact with
the participating nonpublic agency.
Crucial to this defense is individual choice, which requires both
sufficient autonomy to choose and sufficient options for the choice to
be meaningful. The sheer fact that the arena involves subsistence (as
well as day care, substance abuse treatment, and other services cru-
cial to daily survival) renders questionable the assertion that recipi-
ents are freely and autonomously choosing. Autonomous choice is in
jeopardy when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is
offered these necessities on conditions that she might quickly refuse
under other circumstances. Consider a single mother who left home
with her two preschool children out of fear of domestic violence.
Upon arriving at the local church that has the city contract for pro-
viding temporary assistance, she may be too afraid to object to the
religious character of the services. “Choosing” a religious provider
under these circumstances may reflect the kind of duress that calls
into question the volition involved. Rather than an individual choos-
ing, we would have a government manipulating and burdening the
choice of the individual. Especially if the alternative is farther away,
less visible, or less convenient, a voucher recipient may end up with a
pervasively religious provider of a particular denomination, despite a
desire to receive help elsewhere. Faced with the power of a case-
worker to deny eligibility for the voucher in the first place, a destitute
and desperate person may be quite reluctant to voice concerns about
the location and identity of the service provider.
Another Establishment Clause problem—the delegation of state
functions to religious groups—could arise if a state turned all charita-
ble responsibility over to private, religious organizations and left no
secular or public option. The statute in fact requires states to provide
an alternative to an individual who objects to a particular religious
provider,
159 but the alternative might simply be another religious pro-
vider, or even a secular nonprofit entity. The statute does not require
preservation of a public governmental option. Elimination of a pub-
lic, secular option for the distribution of human necessities such as
food and shelter would pressure individuals toward a religious option
they might not want.
The elimination of a public, secular option may be challenged as a
delegation of state functions to religious groups and thus create an-
159. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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other sort of Establishment Clause problem. If a state chooses to turn
all of its welfare activities over to one religious organization, this
could amount to a delegation of state functions to a religious organi-
zation. Such a delegation was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Grendel’s Den
160 and Kiryas Joel.
161 Further, elimination of a public,
secular option could expose a state to the kind of political divisive-
ness along religious lines that the First Amendment was meant to
prevent. However, this objection could well fail, given the power re-
tained by the states under the statute to designate which contracting
partners and organizations will be permitted to accept vouchers.
c. Jeopardy to the religious free exercise for the destitute and
desperate. Voucher programs may directly burden the right of
destitute and desperate individuals to exercise freely their own
religion or nonreligion, as the case may be. What if the closest
provider of food and food stamps requires prayer before any food or
food stamps are distributed? Even a staunch atheist who is
sufficiently hungry and poor might end up praying. For those who
believe in prayer, this could be a wonderful result, but it looks quite
different from the perspective of one whose own beliefs take a
different shape. It is possible that courts would find individuals
seeking temporary public assistance, food stamps, emergency medical
and disability assistance, and even substance abuse treatment,
vulnerable to coercion, forced to engage in practices they do not
support, or forced to put aside spiritual beliefs they otherwise hold.
  The statute prohibits discrimination against beneficiaries on the
basis of religion.
162 It also calls upon the states to accommodate an in-
dividual who objects to the religious character of the organization
from which the individual receives benefits under the Act.
163 Notably,
160. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 122-27 (1982) (holding that the “wall” of sepa-
ration between church and state is “breached by vesting discretionary governmental powers in
religious bodies”).
161. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696-702, 706, 709-10 (1994)
(plurality) (citing an unconstitutional delegation of state power to churches as one ground for
the Court’s rejection of the legislative scheme). The Court’s general theory in Kiryas Joel em-
phasized concern that the legislature itself would fail to act neutrally in seeking to accommo-
date a particular religious community. See id. at 702-05.
162.S e e  42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (“Except as otherwise provided in law, a religious organization
shall not discriminate against an individual in regard to rendering assistance funded under any
program described in subsection (a)(2) on the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to
actively participate in a religious practice.”).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e)(1) provides as follows:MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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though, nothing in the Act requires states to notify applicants of such
a right to object. The absence of a statutory duty to tell applicants of
their option to object to services provided by a religious organization
reduces the likelihood of such objections from economically and psy-
chologically vulnerable people. The vulnerability of applicants in
need of financial assistance could profoundly affect their ability and
willingness to object to the provision of aid through a particular re-
ligious organization.
  An individual’s freedom of religion might be powerfully con-
strained even by compliance with the statutory requirement that an
alternative provider be found within a reasonable time after an appli-
cant’s objection to the offer of a religious provider. If no prior ar-
rangements have been made, it could take weeks or even months to
locate and to arrange for an alternative provider, and the state could
well characterize this as a reasonable time period. For the destitute
individual, however, the prospect of an extended wait could lead to
giving up on the objection, or suppressing it altogether, at the poten-
tial cost of conscientious belief. The secular alternative may impose
more difficult transportation or provide fewer hours of service. Liti-
gation may well test the amount of time that would be reasonable for
providing an alternative, as well as what it would take to make the
right to object sufficiently protective of applicants’ rights of free ex-
ercise.
d. Participation by an identifiable subset of religious groups.
If charitable choice in practice promotes only one religion, or an
identifiable subset of religions, or even religious organizations to the
exclusion of nonreligious ones, the program could be challenged as
an as-applied Establishment Clause violation under a Bowen
rationale.
164 As yet, there is no comprehensive study of how charitable
choice works in practice, but there is good evidence that only a
limited number of identifiable religious organizations will agree to
participate. The National Association of Evangelicals, for example,
If an individual . . . [who receives, applies for or requests to apply for assistance] has
an objection to the religious character of the organization or institution from which
the individual receives, or would receive, assistance funded under any program . . .
the State in which the individual resides shall provide such individual (if otherwise
eligible for such assistance) within a reasonable period of time after the date of such
objection with assistance from an alternative provider that is accessible to the indi-
vidual and the value of which is not less than the value of the assistance which the in-
dividual would have received from such organization.
164.S e e  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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endorses charitable choice.
165 Moreover, Father Fred Kammer, the
president of Catholic Charities, U.S.A., has suggested that charitable
choice can help his organization in its work.
166 In contrast, Southern
Baptist Christian Life President Richard D. Land counsels against
participation, because the organization’s mission could be corrupted
by taking public monies.
167 Similarly, others warn that government
involvement might jeopardize the independence of a religious
organization or its religious commitment to serve as advocates for the
poor.
168 The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs believes the
165.S e e  Heeding the Call of the Poor: Let the Church Be the Church (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.nae.net/resolutions/recent/7.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (resolution
adopted by the 55th annual meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals) (“We are en-
couraged by the ‘Charitable Choice’ provision of the welfare reform legislation, something we
have long promoted.”).
166. See National Public Radio, Morning Edition (radio broadcast, Sept. 6, 1996). NPR
quoted Father Kammer as saying that “his organization was comfortable with the old restric-
tions against mixing church and state, and [that] even with the new law, Catholic Charities
doesn’t plan to change.” Id. Father Kammer himself said on the program, “I think it will help
even us, though, kind of around the edges. We’ve had overzealous secularists, I would call
them, try to say we could not partner with government or participate in some programs because
we were a Catholic charity.” Id.
167.S e e   ‘Charitable Choice’ Entangles Church and State, Say Ethicists (Aug. 29, 1996)
<http://www.umr.org/HTfoxhen.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Land . . . agreed
that with federal funding will come unacceptable government oversight and restrictions.”). The
commission recently changed its name to the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission. Randy
Frame quotes the general counsel of the Baptist Joint Committee as opposing charitable
choice. See Randy Frame, God in a Box?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 7, 1997, at 46, available
in <http://www.christianity.net/ct/7T4/7T4046.html> (on file with Duke Law Journal) (“While
the law’s supporters claim it is good for religion . . . it actually violates the Constitution and
jeopardizes the healthy neutrality between government and religion.”).
168.S e e  S TEPHEN  V. MONSMA, WHEN  SACRED AND SECULAR  MIX: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 81-99, 128-29, 154-61 (1997) (reporting that
a significant minority of religious social service agencies that have accepted government funds
experience conflicts with the government over their religious missions); Carlson-Thies, supra
note 131, at 682 (describing the fear among “conservative churches” that “government money
comes with strings” that will hinder religious expression); Melissa Rogers, Threat to Religion,
SOJOURNERS MAG. (July-Aug. 1998) <http://www.sojourners.com/soj9807/980722b.html> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (cautioning against charitable choice because “it opens the
door to invasive government monitoring, regulation, and accounting of churches and other per-
vasively sectarian ministries.”).
Ironically, Marvin Olasky, whose work is often cited by supporters of charitable choice,
urges church groups to resist the temptation of the money and to refuse to partner with the
states. Olasky argues that only God can help to reform the vulnerable; thus, church groups
should resist the temptation to take any public money that could constrain religious teaching.
See Marvin Olasky, Holes in the Soul Matter as Much as Dollars, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1996,
at 12A; see also Robyn Blumner, And Now, Welfare for Churches (Nov. 1996)
<http://www.aclufl.org/welf1196.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting Olasky).
Olasky apparently thinks that the welfare reform law did not go far enough because it specifies
that its funds must not be used directly to support worship and proselytizing.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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charitable-choice provision is unconstitutional,
169 as does the
American Jewish Committee.
170 Other religious groups may resist
participation because they find the entire welfare reform problematic
or even immoral. They can cite their already overburdened shelters
and soup kitchens as reasons to reject the premise that religious
groups can bail out the government.
  A notable discrepancy in the types of religious groups that seek
participation could emerge. Then, an as-applied challenge could be
mounted to demonstrate an unacceptable pattern of support for only
one religion or a select set of religions.
171 Advancing a limited set of
identifiable religious groups with public dollars and public duties
would risk governmental establishment of religion and would also
exacerbate community divisions over religion.
 
e. Summary. Charitable choice thus faces potentially formidable
constitutional challenges by directing public dollars to pervasively re-
ligious institutions, by providing public support for worship and
proselytizing, by burdening the free exercise of religion of vulnerable
individuals, and by providing support to an identifiable, limited set of
religious groups. A state could also be charged with wrongly dele-
gating a governmental function to religious groups if it turned the en-
tire welfare task over to them. Indeed, all the points of potential con-
stitutional vulnerability could grow larger as charitable choice is im-
plemented. Consider the following scenarios:
￿  The only local provider of services is a single religious or-
ganization that requires participation in religious activi-
ties.
￿  The only local provider of services is a single religious or-
ganization that does not require participation in religious
169.S e e  Dwight Jessup, Resolution on the Charitable Choice Provision in the New Welfare
Act (Oct. 8, 1996) <http://cgibin1.erols.com/bjcpa/timely/charchc.html> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
170.S e e  Jeremy Leaming, Civil Libertarians Prepare Suit to Bolster Wall Between Church,
State (Jan. 8, 1998) <http://www.freedomforum.org/religion/news/980108.asp> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (describing a potential lawsuit against charitable choice that could include
the American Civil Liberties Union the and American Jewish Congress as plaintiffs).
171. Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution, while believing in the social benefits of relig-
ion, concluded that “government involvement in sectarian affairs not only unwisely linked the
fortunes of religion to the outcome of political squabbles but also necessarily resulted in relig-
ious favoritism that gave more religious legitimacy to some religious practices than to others.
Free religious practice, American style, could not flourish in such an atmosphere.” Kramnick &
Moore, supra note 111, at 47.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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activity, but such activities pervade every contact with the
organization.
￿  To comply with the statutory requirement of an alterna-
tive provider within a reasonable time after an applicant’s
objection, the state contracts with other providers or ap-
proves others to receive vouchers, but they are not located
in the same town.
￿  Individuals do not object to the religious character of the
services because they are never informed that they may
do so, because they are intimidated or threatened that
they will not receive services if they do so, or because, like
the single homeless mother of two young children fleeing
domestic violence, they fear they have no alternative.
In each circumstance, charitable choice could violate both the Es-
tablishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. If the state directly
contracts with the religious organization to provide welfare services,
government funds could be seen as advancing and becoming exces-
sively entangled with religion, and the free exercise rights of an indi-
vidual applicant could be unduly burdened. If social services are re-
deemed on an individual voucher basis, the Constitution may afford
more latitude for the governmental partnership with religious groups
because private individual choice interrupts the flow of public money
to religious organizations. Yet, the validity of that choice, given the
individual’s economic and potential psychological privation and ac-
tual set of options, could become a genuine question, exposing fur-
ther constitutional vulnerabilities.
As a sheer matter of policy, my own view is that partnerships be-
tween governments and religious organizations may offer better re-
sponses to human needs than solely governmental provision, so long
as the risks of promoting a limited number of religions and burdening
individual beliefs are minimized.
172 There are many admirable fea-
172. Beyond the charitable-choice provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act, other federal and state initiatives explore new connections be-
tween religious organizations and governments in meeting the needs of poor and dependent
populations. Governor George W. Bush has committed Texas to partnerships with religious
groups that focus on spiritually based programs in the context of drug treatment and rehabilita-
tion. See INFORMS (Inmate Family Organization Relationship Management System), Texas
Governor George Bush: ‘You’re Changing Lives from the Inside Out’, (Mar. 11, 1997)
<http://www.cjm.org/Mar97/Mar97.htm#Texas Governor George Bush:> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal); see also Jim Jones, Separation Anxiety: The Line Between Church and State Is
Being Erased, Warns a Watchdog Group, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 24, 1998, at
Life & Arts 3 (describing one organization’s concerns about a Texas pre-release program at aMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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tures of charitable choice. It promotes pluralism in the values and set-
tings in which support can be offered, and it strengthens the work of
people who are devoted to assisting those in need for reasons larger
than a paycheck. Furthermore, religious groups helping those who
are impoverished, those who abuse drugs and alcohol, and those who
have been unable to put their lives together are more likely to ad-
dress the individual in need as a whole person, with spiritual as well
as material needs, and with the same spark of dignity as the people
offering help. For many religiously inspired providers, it is a gift to
have the chance to help.
173 This attitude can grace the encounters be-
tween those who give and those who receive help with respect and at-
tentiveness, rather than with bureaucratic indifference. If compatible
with the beliefs of the recipient, religious messages and guidance can
afford sources of the strength, hope, discipline, and fellowship capa-
ble of producing long-term change in the lives of those affected.
Thus, charitable choice may hold some promise if it is managed care-
fully to ensure real choice and to avoid the appearance of govern-
mental endorsement of particular religions or of delegation of public
tasks to religious groups. Accordingly, it would be necessary to retain
public standards against discrimination on the basis of religion, gen-
der, sexuality, and race; to ensure secular and public options equiva-
lent in value and accessibility; and to make the exercise of such op-
tions a genuine possibility, even for very desperate people.
At their best, vouchers for subsistence needs, social services, and
schooling promote effective partnerships between public and private
actors, between federal and local actors, and between public norms
and personal connections. The promise of vouchers, revised to ensure
these dimensions of partnership, becomes apparent when contrasted
minimum-security prison in Richmond, “which is the first in the nation to be operated round-
the-clock by a private Christian group”); Mede Nix, Faith, Prison Link Is Explored; Christian
Group Seeks Role at Venus Facility, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at 1 (“The
faith-based prison movement has grown out of Gov. George W. Bush’s efforts and legislation
designed to get private and religious groups involved in programs that were previously state
sponsored, such as welfare-to-work.”). Governor Bush has also proposed privatizing the state’s
welfare system to allow churches to act as local welfare service organizations. Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, and Virginia are exploring similar partnerships between religious organizations and the
state. Especially in treating substance abuse, there are impressive studies demonstrating greater
success rates by groups that are either religiously affiliated or informed by religious belief sys-
tems. See KLAUS MÄKELÄ ET AL., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AS MUTUAL-HELP MOVEMENT:
A STUDY IN EIGHT SOCIETIES passim (1996).
173.S e e  WALLIS, SOUL OF POLITICS, supra note 145, at 48-49, 51-56, 82-86, 166-67, 177-81
(discussing how the prophetic spiritual movement can invigorate community-based activism).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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with simpler solutions that underlie contemporary debates over social
provision.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH SIMPLER SOLUTIONS
As often touted in the rhetoric of private choice, vouchers create
connections between public bodies and private providers. Those con-
nections can be minimal, with the government simply serving as a
pass-through agent, or they can be more complex, with the govern-
ment affecting the content of programs and private entities affecting
the government’s priorities. The more complex arrangements may
trouble people who yearn for simple solutions. Yet, this country has
long rejected simple models of social provision and has embraced
complex solutions to reflect its diversity and pluralism.
Consider three simple alternatives for organizing social resources
to meet the needs of dependents, whether the poor or children:
(1) each “community” is responsible for “its own”;
(2) the largest unit of public authority—typically, the national
government—is responsible;
(3)  no one, or no one outside the immediate family, is responsi-
ble.
174
The first alternative presents definitional problems—what is a
“community” and who constitutes “its own”? A community could be
defined in geographic terms, in terms of social networks, or in terms
of an affiliation with a shared religious, ethnic, or ideological experi-
ence or commitment. Society could then organize its social provision
by directing that each municipality be responsible for its dependent
residents, or that each religious group fulfill the basic needs for adults
and children who are affiliated with the religion. There can even be a
combination of these geographic and subgroup notions, as the
Catholic and Mormon Churches pursue through systems of par-
ishes.
175 But aside from these crucial definitional problems, this alter-
native reflects two deeply problematic assumptions.
174. Although I do not directly engage the persistent debate over the causes of poverty—
alternately attributing it to the character of the poor, to social malfunctioning, or to failures in
the economic structure—this array of alternatives reflects that debate.
175.S e e  Mormon Temple First Built in Ohio Since 1838, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 23,
1999, at B2 (explaining the division of Mormons into stakes, akin to dioceses, and wards, akin
to parishes); Richard Zneimer, The Rise of America’s Spirit of Tolerance, SCHOLASTIC
UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1985, at 7, 9 (describing the Catholic requirement that each parish have a
school);  see also R. LAURENCE  MOORE, RELIGIOUS  OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OFMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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Declaring that each community will take care of its own rests on
two assumptions: (1) that all comparable communities, whether geo-
graphic, religious, ethnic, or otherwise constituted, will perform the
same roles toward dependents; and (2) that no people will be left out
of the pattern—no one who will fall outside the “our own” of some
community. As an empirical matter, these assumptions are simply not
accurate. Abundant historical examples illustrate failed public efforts
to require each community to care for its own. The English Poor
Laws embraced the principle of local responsibility for the poor.
176
The 1662 amendment to the Poor Laws not only designed a period of
residence as a requirement for receiving assistance, but also directed
the return of a newcomer even if he did not apply for assistance.
177
Several American colonies adopted versions of the English Poor
laws.
178 Plymouth, for example, ruled in 1642 that each town must
support its own indigents.
179 Later, the Plymouth Colony adopted
strict residency requirements and placed restrictions on bringing into
town anyone liable to become a public charge.
180 Similar rules were
AMERICANS 48-72 (1986) (examining the origin of ethnically identified Catholic parishes in the
United States).
176.S e e  J UNE  AXINN  & HERMAN  LEVIN, SOCIAL  WELFARE: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO NEED 13-14 (4th ed. 1997); MAXWELL H. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN
LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 100 (1976) (discussing the settlement provi-
sions of the Poor Law); E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 222-
23 (1963) (noting that the English poor had a disincentive to migrate to industrial centers for
fear of losing their “settlement,” or claim to support under the Poor Law); see also Larry Cat￿
Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a General
Theory of Modern American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871 (1995) (finding paral-
lels between the English Poor Law and contemporary welfare policies in the United States).
177. The Settlement Law of 1662 amended the Poor Law to allow authorities to expel any-
one likely to become impoverished and to send that person back to the parish of his settlement.
See An Acte for the Reliefe of the Poore of this Kingdom, 14 Car. 2, ch. 12, § 6 (1662). Ameri-
can colonies copied this practice. See BENJAMIN JOSEPH KLEBANER, PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN
AMERICA, 1790-1860, at ch. 4 (1976); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employ-
ment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85,
88 (1982).
178.S e e  AXINN & LEVIN, supra note 176, at 15-16.
179. Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental Constitution, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 159,
163 (1997) (describing welfare schemes in American colonies that mirrored the English Poor
Law).
180.S e e  LUCY KOMISAR, DOWN AND OUT IN THE USA: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE
14-15 (rev. ed. 1977). For example, ship captains were charged with any expenses arising from
the landing of needy persons in Plymouth; they also had to return such passengers to their place
of origin. See M ARCUS  WILSON  JERNEGAN, LABORING AND DEPENDENT  CLASSES IN
COLONIAL AMERICA, 1607-1783, at 192 (Frederick Ungar Publishing 1960) (1931).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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adopted elsewhere in New England and in the Northwestern Territo-
ries in 1795.
181
Increased geographic mobility created difficulties in implement-
ing the traditional principle that each community was responsible for
its own poor.
182 Each town relied on a notion of “inhabitancy” rather
than residence and used a system of “warning out” individuals lack-
ing inhabitancy to lay the basis for removing them from the town if
they became public charges.
183 Hendrik Hartog noted:
The harshness of a warning out system was presumably mitigated by
the fact that some town somewhere would have to take in and care
for the transient poor. . . . [B]y definition everyone had an inhabi-
tancy somewhere, no matter how many towns from which an indi-
vidual had been warned out. The problem was that inhabitancy
might be virtually undiscoverable, particularly in a situation where
there was no incentive for a town to volunteer itself as a poor per-
son’s home.
184
Even a person who lived for twenty years in a town could be warned
out and sent from her home when she became destitute.
185
Perhaps in response to such problems during the eighteenth cen-
tury, religious and ethnic groups organized charities to support pri-
marily their own members.
186 The model of caring for the commu-
nity’s own persisted, but the unit for community was religious, ethnic,
or in some cases occupational, rather than secular and governmental.
Catholic charities emerged both to fulfill a religious duty and to serve
181. See KOMISAR, supra note 180, at 19 (discussing similar laws enacted in the Northwest
Territories); SYDNEY LENS, POVERTY: AMERICA’S ENDURING PARADOX: A HISTORY OF THE
RICHEST NATION’S UNWON WAR 38 (1969) (examining comparable laws in New Amsterdam
and Rhode Island).
182.S e e  Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court, Judicial Government in
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 292-93 (1976).
183. See id.
184.I d .
185. See id.
186.S e e  SARAH DEUTSCH, NO SEPARATE REFUGE: CULTURE, CLASS, AND GENDER ON
AN  ANGLO-HISPANIC  FRONTIER IN THE AMERICAN  SOUTHWEST, 1880-1940, at 26, 154-56
(1987) (describing the development of Hispanic mutual aid societies); ROBERT  WUTHNOW,
THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II
103-06 (1988) (describing the charitable efforts of religious groups); Leon Fink, Labor, Liberty,
and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 244, 249 (David Thelen ed., 1988) (noting the influence
of voluntary associations and Christian communalism on the development of trade unions
seeking to advance their members’ interests).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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as a form of mutual self-help against a difficult and potentially hostile
larger world, just as other immigrant groups formed social and fra-
ternal mutual aid societies.
187 The Italian Missionary Sisters of the Sa-
cred Heart, for example, ran hospitals in New York, Chicago, and
Philadelphia especially for Italian immigrants.
188 In general, Catholic
hospitals, agencies, and schools paralleled public hospitals, agencies,
and schools.
189 Private organizations also worked cooperatively with
towns and counties on issues of relief.
190 Yet, these religiously and
ethnically based efforts never reached the needs of all members of
each group, and they never touched those who lacked sufficiently or-
ganized and well-resourced affiliations.
191 By the end of the nine-
teenth century, reformers were criticizing the reliance on a system of
local charity, because it defeated a principle of public responsibility
and prevented the achievement of minimum standards in welfare and
education.
192
As state and federal programs developed in the twentieth century
to meet the needs of indigents, localities and states increasingly set
minimum residency requirements as a condition for eligibility.
193 The
United States Supreme Court, however, set limitations on such resi-
dency requirements in the name of the right to travel. In Shapiro v.
Thompson,
194 the Court rejected a one-year residency requirement
187. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 63-65 (1986).
188. See id. at 64.
189. See id.
190. See John Drew, The Democratization of Outdoor Relief, in THE AMERICAN WELFARE
SYSTEM: ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND EFFECTS 97, 97-108 (Howard Gensler ed., 1996) (noting
that reliance on private organizations during this period was particularly prevalent in the East).
191.S e e  KATZ, supra note 187, at 83-87 (describing the failure of the charitable organiza-
tion movement); Drew, supra note 190, at 115-20 (recounting criticism that charitable relief
efforts were not effectively reaching dependent children); see also M INA C ARSON,
SETTLEMENT FOLK: SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT, 1885-
1930, at 69-121 (1990) (discussing how settlement-house reformers tried to help immigrants
unable to deal with industrialization, poverty, and other problems); CREMIN, supra note 35, at
70-84 (describing how institutional churches and settlement houses responded to various social
and urban problems); THEDA  SKOCPOL, PROTECTING  SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1992) (discussing the role
of women’s clubs in promoting broad social legislation and of fraternal orders in pressing for
government old-age pensions). Skocpol also notes the relative success of women’s clubs and the
relative failure of the fraternal orders in meeting social needs. See SKOCPOL, supra, at 56.
192. See 2  EDITH  ABBOTT, PUBLIC  ASSISTANCE: AMERICAN  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
509-10 (Russell & Russell 1966) (1940).
193.S e e  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621-27 (1969).
194. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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imposed by local governments.
195 Similarly, the Court rejected as a
violation of equal protection an Arizona statute requiring one year’s
residence in a county as a condition for receiving nonemergency
medical care at county expense.
196 The Supreme Court most recently
affirmed the rationale of these cases in Saenz v. Roe
197 in 1999. In a 7-
2 vote, the Court rejected California’s effort to limit public assistance
for the first year of California residency to the level an individual
would have received in the state of his prior residence.
198 The Court
reaffirmed a right to travel under the Equal Protection Clause, in-
cluding the right to enter and to leave a state, the right to be welcome
as a temporary visitor, and the right to be welcome in a new state as a
permanent resident.
199 Moreover, newly arrived citizens are entitled
to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as others who share their
citizenship.
200 The Court thus soundly rejected the view, adopted by
California, that each state should take care of its own dependents and
that individuals should not be able to take advantage of higher levels
of support offered in another state, at least during the first year after
a move.
201
The Supreme Court’s record has been more mixed when dealing
with certain requirements used to limit eligibility for public educa-
tion. The Court has sometimes approved local residency require-
ments under the rationale that these residency requirements serve
each state’s interest in assuring that only state residents take advan-
tage of state educational services.
202 In addition, localities typically
195. See id. at 631. Interestingly, the abolition of the welfare program itself would have
been constitutional in Shapiro. See id. at 633.
196. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). However, nothing in
the Constitution would forbid the government from eliminating nonemergency medical care
provided for everyone at county expense.
197. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
198. See id. at 1524-30.
199. See id. at 1525.
200. See id. at 1525-26.
201. See id. at 1527-30.
202. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding a Texas statute authorizing
local school districts to deny tuition-free admission to public schools for minors who live apart
from parents or guardians and who are present in the district primarily to attend free public
schools). States may recognize a guardian rather than a parent as the source of the child’s resi-
dence under a “best interests” test, but some states are permitted to restrict such devices where
a student changes guardianship solely to attend school in the district. See, e.g., Israel S. v. Board
of Educ., 601 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
The courts, however, have struggled over how to handle the residency issue for children
who are homeless. The federal district court in the District of Columbia found no claim underMINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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have the authority to set tax rates used for financing public schools,
thus producing dramatic variations in per-pupil expenditures across
communities.
203 This authority provides another way for local com-
munities to express their commitment to take care of their own chil-
dren, but not the children of others.
204
In contrast, the Court has struck down citizenship requirements
that limit eligibility for certain public programs. In Plyler v. Doe,
205 a
plurality of Justices (four out of nine) held that Texas could not deny
public education to school-age children who are not citizens or legally
admitted aliens.
206 The plurality opinion found that the state lacked a
rational ground for discriminating on the basis of citizenship status,
noting that the children were not to blame for their presence in the
United States and acknowledging the importance of education in as-
suring their economic self-sufficiency.
207 The Supreme Court has since
refused to extend Plyler, emphasizing its unique circumstances.
208
Nonetheless, a federal district court recently revived Plyler when it
considered California’s Proposition 187, a voter initiative denying
the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to permit homeless children to enroll in
schools connected with their prior residences. See Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-
0910 (RCL), 1992 WL 151813, at *6-*7 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992). The appellate court reversed,
finding that such an enforceable educational right does exist for homeless children. See Lamp-
kin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1994). On remand, the district court
enjoined the District to provide educational services, including transportation. See Lampkin v.
District of Columbia, 879 F. Supp. 116, 119 (D.D.C. 1995). Subsequently, the District of Co-
lumbia withdrew from the McKinney Act Education Program, which led to a dissolution of the
court’s injunction. See Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 886 F. Supp. 56, 62 (1995).
203. These variations can be subjected to state limitations established by statute and, in-
creasingly, by courts interpreting state constitutions. See generally Molly S. McUsic, The Law’s
Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in
LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX  STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING  EDUCATIONAL  EQUITY 88
(Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). Many state courts have held educational finance systems unconsti-
tutional under state constitutional theories. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. 66 v.
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
204. Note that in addition to the power of a local community to exclude others by having
real estate too expensive for them to buy or rent, the system of “each community cares for its
own” generates and sustains inequalities between communities.
205. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
206.S e e  id. at 221-30.
207. See id. at 220-23.
208.S e e  Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (upholding a North Da-
kota program permitting local school boards to assess a user fee for transporting students to
and from public schools and explicitly noting that the Court has not extended the holding of
Plyler beyond the circumstances that provoked its unique confluence of theories and ration-
ales).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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public education to undocumented immigrant children.
209 The court,
relying in part on Plyler, rejected substantial portions of the proposi-
tion as unconstitutional and then approved an agreement between
the state of California and civil rights groups to drop remaining por-
tions of the suit.
 210
Thus, despite the attraction of reserving to local towns and states
the primary responsibility for taking care of their own, localities and
states have not been free to exclude individuals on the basis of resi-
dency or citizenship. The model of each community caring for its own
has come into conflict with contemporary norms, as well as judicial
interpretations of the constitutional rights to equal protection of the
laws, due process, and the freedom to travel. Even though majorities
of those voting for state initiatives and legislation often revive the
community model, hard-won and now-settled interpretations of the
Constitution sharply limit the ability of states and localities to ex-
clude individuals seeking aid.
 211
The second simple alternative would place responsibility for so-
cial provision and education in the public, rather than the private,
sector, pinning the ultimate duty on the federal government. This al-
ternative does not require the federal government itself to create and
to operate social welfare agencies, schools, food pantries, and the
like. It only demands that the federal government ensure the per-
formance of social provision and education, whether through direc-
tives, contracts, or cooperative relationships with state and local gov-
ernments, religious groups, and other private entities.
212 A paradig-
209.S e e  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 785 (C.D. Cal.
1995). Proposition 187 reflects the goal of ensuring that undocumented aliens in the United
States do not receive benefits or public services in the state of California. Sections 7 and 8 spe-
cifically exclude undocumented aliens from public elementary, secondary, and postsecondary
schools in the State. See id. at 787-91.
210. See id. at 774, 785; see also Tom Harrigan, Judge Oks Agreement Ending Attempts to
Revive Prop. 187, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 14, 1999, at A3. The federal judge in
League of United Latin American Citizens further ruled that Proposition 187 could not stand in
the face of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
which demonstrated the federal occupation of the domain of immigrant access to public bene-
fits.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 997 F. Supp. at 1253-55; see also Patrick J.
McDonnell, Judge’s Final Order Kills Key Points of Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at
A3; Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Found Unconstitutional by Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1997, at A1. The Governor dropped plans to appeal as part of a mediated settlement
of the remainder of the suit. Groups that helped to draft Proposition 187 may themselves seek
further appellate review. See Harrigan, supra, at A3.
211.S e e  supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., AXINN & LEVIN, supra note 176, at 174-202 (examining a range of partner-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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matic example is Social Security, the federally administered and fed-
eral-based entitlement program for the elderly.
213 In the context of
the poor, however, the recent elimination of an enforceable federal
entitlement signals a rejection of federal responsibility for social pro-
vision of the poor.
214
This country, unlike others, has also rejected federal responsibil-
ity for children’s education.
215 It is true that the federal government
subsidizes public education with specially targeted monies to assist
programs for children in poverty and children with special educa-
tional needs.
216 The Supreme Court has also commanded equal avail-
ability of public education within a state that has chosen to provide
it.
217 Despite this mandate, the responsibility for education has fallen
mainly on the states and localities. All of the state constitutions guar-
antee public education for children, and school-financed litigation
over the past several decades has produced court orders in some
states specifying a right to an effective education.
218 Given the reli-
ance of such lawsuits on particular state constitutional commitments,
no uniformity has emerged across the nation. Consequently, massive
disparities continue to exist in expenditure, quality, and opportunity
both within and across the states. The democratic and constitutional
processes in the country have treated federal responsibility for social
provision and education as unworkable and undesirable. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has construed the Constitution even to forbid state
ships with states and private agencies, direct federal grants, and federally mandated benefits
adopted during the New Deal).
213.S e e  42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1994) .
214.S e e  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. III 1997).
215. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 54-55 (1973) (rejecting
the theory that education is a fundamental federal right and upholding a scheme for state-wide
school financing that resulted in unequal per-pupil expenditures between districts). The Court
has also ruled that parents have the right to choose private schools for their children. See Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (concluding that a state may not require atten-
dance in public schools in order to fulfill compulsory school requirements).
216.S e e  Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, §§ 201-12, 79
Stat. 27, 27-32 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (providing financial
support and incentives for specific state educational programs); Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997) (establishing standards for free appro-
priate education for children with disabilities).
217.S e e  Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (declaring that educational op-
portunity, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms”).
218.S e e  McUsic, supra note 203, at 102-15, 134-37.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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and local governments to hold a monopoly on education. Public
compulsory schooling laws must permit parents to opt out of public
schools for religious or other private options.
219
The third alternative—responsibility resting on no one, or at least
no one outside the immediate family—leaves social provision and
education to the voluntary actions of individuals. With regard to care
for the poor, the homeless, or otherwise dependent individuals, this
nation seems to be drifting toward this model. With regard to
schooling, this model seems moot, since each state has adopted com-
pulsory school laws and state constitutions include a provision assur-
ing children some kind of access to basic education.
220 Therefore, at
least by state law, the polity has designated public responsibility for
provision of education, at least through high school.
221 The remaining
domain of private family responsibility in our system includes paren-
tal prerogatives to select private schools, subject to the family’s abil-
ity to pay or to obtain scholarships, and parental duties to supervise
children’s educational experiences, including homework.
Nonetheless, the potential exists for the third alternative to be-
come a more salient feature of American education. As schooling
moves into a more competitive model, either within the public system
or across public and private options, parents are given greater re-
sponsibility for selecting schools for their children. As a result, chil-
dren will become increasingly dependent on their parents’ or guardi-
ans’ exercising informed choices. The quality control for education
then will be shifted at least partially from the public sector to individ-
ual parents. When parents or guardians lack the ability, motivation,
or knowledge to fulfill this function, the third alternative becomes
more germane.
222 Even if school choice is coupled with communal or
219.S e e  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. Under special circumstances, the Court also permitted
Amish parents to evade enforcement of compulsory schooling after their children completed
eighth grade. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
220.S e e  C REMIN,  supra note 35, at 297 (noting that all states then in the Union had
adopted compulsory education laws by 1918). On state constitutional provisions governing
education, see McUsic, supra note 203, at 103.
221.S e e  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. This case helped to inspire a movement for home-schooling
by parents. See Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Case Undue
Burden Standard, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 371-73 (1995).
222.S e e  The Limits of Choice, supra note 19, at 2002-03 (claiming that school choice re-
forms “risk creating pockets of failure—public schools in economically depressed areas . . . that
serve a body of uninvolved parents and guardians,” and asserting that “[e]ven if a competitive
education market ultimately weeds out deficient schools, until those schools go out of business,
students will be deprived of an adequate education”); see also Joseph G. Weeres & Bruce Coo-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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federal obligations, such “choice” may take place in a world of insuf-
ficient numbers of quality schools, inadequate information about the
stakes and alternatives, and large numbers of people unable to use
the choice system effectively. This state of affairs means choice for
some and not for others, and whether a child’s educational needs are
met will depend on her parents’ ability to choose.
Advocates of school choice claim that competition will favor
those schools that deliver better results and that over time the bad
schools will close and disappear.
223 It remains to be seen, however, if
the system will work out a timely, practical mechanism for identifying
and shutting down “failing” schools before their students have lost
meaningful chances to receive education elsewhere.
224 Vouchers, in
the meantime, may make liberty the only value—and in practice, lib-
erty only for some. Combining vouchers with state or federal stan-
dards, however, could propel equality of opportunity as well as lib-
erty, quality as well as choice, and central responsibility as a para-
doxical correlate of local control.
As this brief discussion indicates, our country has properly re-
sisted simple models for social provision and education.
225 We have
embraced more complex solutions that combine notions of commu-
nity responsibility, local government and private activities, and na-
tional standards. We should continue to do so. Voucher proposals for
schooling and for charitable choice have the potential for fostering
combinations of religious and secular providers in a general scheme
of social provision. Public dollars can be accompanied by basic public
standards to protect against the abandonment of each person and
family, left always to provide for themselves. This political moment
per, Public Choice Perspectives on Urban Schools, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 57, 67 (James V. Cibulka et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that market solutions
require: (1) equally legitimate differences in preferences; (2) individuals who are knowledge-
able about the quality of services and able to evaluate and to compare them; (3) individuals
who can freely move from one supplier to the next and learn from experience; and (4) many
competing providers).
223.S e e  Greg D. Andres, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 795, 814 (1995). For a thorough treatment of how vouchers will affect failing schools,
see The Limits of Choice, supra note 19.
224.S e e  Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schooling a Private Business, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 669, 698-712 (1999) (describing the problems of resorting to a market system of education
and arguing for standards-based reform rather than privatization).
225. Other systems have their own complications. Canada, for example, has a system that
pays for Catholic as well as public schools; currently, parents of other religions have argued
that public funds should also support their religious schools. See P. Jameson McCloskey, On-
tario Case Tests Religious-School Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at B4.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
552 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:493
holds rich promise for reinvigorated public conversation about
meeting human needs as federal governmental commitments decline.
Religious and other private groups have always helped to meet the
basic human need for food and shelter of people at the economic
margins; they have also developed some of the best schools for chil-
dren.
226 As public welfare ends and a politics of selfishness rises, the
steadfast commitment of many religious groups to the poor and to
children is notable and commendable. But religious groups cannot fill
in the holes of a gouged public safety net; nor can they develop the
capacity to educate all American children. Religious provision can
never substitute for secular alternatives or provide public norms of
equality and fairness.
227
How should we promote productive connections between these
religious providers and governments? Most helpful now would be
enlargement of the commitments within communities and within the
nation to meet the needs of those who are impoverished and those
who are stuck in poor quality schools. This calls for work internal to
religious communities and localities, but also for a public, civic space
to connect impulses of compassion with democratic and constitu-
tional norms. To this end, we need to conceive of partnerships and
coordination efforts to enhance the actual delivery of services and
schooling, to enlarge respect both for human individuality and for vi-
tal communities of faith and tradition, and to strengthen intellectual
and moral resources to deal with the potentially destructive features
of global markets.
CONCLUSION
Assigning exclusive responsibility for schooling and social serv-
ices to governments violates constitutional protections for free exer-
cise of religion, as well as good sense about the value of pluralism and
the quality of programs infused with religious commitments.
228 Yet,
226. For electronic resources connecting religious groups and laypeople interested in social
supports and community renewal, see Religion and Civic Culture Online, (visited Sept. 15,
1999) <http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/religion_online> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
227. Other features of public schooling, crucial to enabling and fulfilling public norms of
equality and fairness, include equitable school finance, civic education, and curricular programs
that reflect and instill these values.
228. The constitutional objection to exclusive governmental provision of schooling, articu-
lated in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), was bolstered by recognition of paren-
tal prerogatives to guide their children’s development, as well as the freedom of the school pro-
viders to pursue their business and profession. In this lawsuit arising from intergroup conflicts,MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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abandoning to either private communal groups or individual families
all public commitment to schooling and social provision is also un-
wise and contrary to commitments to equality, fairness, and individ-
ual dignity. A more complicated set of partnerships between gov-
ernments and private groups, mixing public norms and individual ac-
tion, may be less elegant, but it is more likely to preserve and to pro-
mote the crucial purposes of private choice, religious and ethnic free-
dom, social cohesion, and equal opportunity and respect across re-
ligious and racial groups for both men and women. Pluralism, main-
tained consistently with and through public norms, can promote indi-
vidual freedom, equality, and mutual respect among different groups.
This nation has embraced pluralism nurtured by and conditioned
upon guarantees of individual freedom and equality.
229 This pluralism
must make room for entities, such as schools, social services, and
providers of basic human needs that are religiously affiliated, but also
for similar entities that are not religiously affiliated. This kind of plu-
ralism should guard against the governmental establishment of relig-
ion and preserve free exercise of religion for individuals; it should
also afford resources for critiquing and monitoring state alliances
with global market forces. A robust independent sector and vibrant
religious communities are thus worthwhile not only for their own
purposes and for the immediate good they do for others, but also for
nurturing normative centers in which people can articulate values po-
tentially at odds with this global moment. Fostering public and pri-
the Court rejected state legislation that would have made attendance at a public school com-
pulsory. See Martha Minow, We the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 299, 304-05 (David Thelen ed., 1988). No compara-
ble decision exists in the realm of welfare or social provision. However, in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), a Supreme Court majority im-
plicitly rejected the dissenters’ view that the creation of a state department to guard against
child abuse created a state monopoly in that area, see id. at 197-98, perhaps acknowledging that
governments have never actually tried to do so.
229. See JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 6, at 321-22:
Things are ‘with’ one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or
dominates over everything. The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. Some-
thing always escapes. . .The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than
like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may
report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, something
else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity.
See also THIEMANN, supra note 55, at 146-51 (focusing on the Free Exercise Clause as one
foundation for a pluralistic society and arguing that, in light of this country’s heritage as a
“melting pot,” the Framers of the Constitution anticipated the potential for factionalism and
developed a government around the core values of liberty, equality, and tolerance to deal with
these pressures).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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vate cooperation, while pursuing some limits on the partnerships with
religious entities, can promote mutual aid and preserve the distinct
contributions each kind of entity makes to the needs of the poor, of
children, and of the larger society.
Michael Ignatieff’s elegant book The Needs of Strangers captures
two crucial yet potentially conflicting insights for societies that mean
to be democratic, pluralist, and decent. Ignatieff first notes that “[w]e
need justice, we need liberty, and we need as much solidarity as can
be reconciled with justice and liberty.”
230 Nations such as ours rightly
endorse and celebrate liberty and justice as primary to human soci-
ety.
231 Rights for individuals afford chances to break away from in-
herited social stations, as well as opportunities to challenge exclu-
sions and degradations based on religion, race, or other traits.
232 Lib-
erty and equality should guide political structure.
233 This includes re-
ligious liberty and freedom from discrimination on the basis of relig-
ious affiliation—or non-affiliation.
234 Alternatives that subordinate
such liberty and equality to solidarity, or any other purpose, are
worse and undesirable.
235 Social solidarity too often comes at the
price of foreshortened liberty, equality, and justice for the variety of
distinct human beings.
236 Even if it were possible to arrange a world in
which “each community cared for its own,” the enforcement required
would constrain individuals intolerably.
237 Therefore, only the forms
of social solidarity compatible with these watchwords should be pro-
moted in constitutional democracies.
238
Yet, here is Ignatieff’s important, additional insight: “It is be-
cause money cannot buy the human gestures which confer respect,
nor rights guarantee them as entitlements, that any decent society re-
quires a public discourse about the needs of the human person.”
239
230. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 141 (1985).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 135-42.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237.I d .
238. See id.
239.I d .  at 13. Jeremy Waldron restated Ignatieff’s idea this way: “[H]umans require the
cultural richness of particular relations to flesh out the bare bones of natural need.” Jeremy
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 886 n.134 (1993).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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The welfare systems that many democracies have produced are de-
meaning and inadequate; too many public schools across the nation
deserve the same adjectives. Neither money nor entitlements admin-
istered by a bureaucratic state can guarantee the basic human needs
for respect, care, connection, and genuine opportunity to flourish.
Placing primary responsibility for those in need with the national
government is highly unlikely to achieve these goals. Nor, of course,
would abandoning all public responsibility for those in need outside
the individual or immediate family. It is important to resist the faulty
assumption that local, private (including religious) initiatives can or
always will afford the human gestures that confer respect and also the
basic social provision that is necessary for the destitute to survive.
Choice might help improve schools and services, but not if exchanged
for the norm of equal regard.
The movements for school choice and for charitable choice re-
flect the admirable belief that we can and therefore must make better
schools available to more children and provide more meaningful
public assistance with strong community ties. These movements also
embody fair criticisms of the public bureaucracies that have made too
many schools and too many social service programs dehumanizing
and incompetent. However, general rules should remain to guide lo-
cal schools and human services. Ultimately, it is a collective responsi-
bility to ensure that no one is abandoned to starvation, privation, or
to a dead-end, dismal school.
Even with the best motivations, private groups, including relig-
ious groups, can demonstrate biases against individuals or members
of other groups. They can perpetuate longstanding lines of exclusion
or degradation on the basis of race, gender, or religion. They can
leave untouched or exacerbate legacies of intergroup conflict and
stigmatized group memberships. They can fail to build sufficient ca-
pacity to reach all with comparable needs. More basically, beyond in-
cluding private religious groups as options in the delivery of educa-
tion and human services, the shift to choice may come to mean shed-
ding public responsibility for social provision. This would be a costly
change, potentially devastating to the very fabric of society. Even in-
dividually attractive choices cannot add up to a shared context for
pursuing the common good. Without that shared context, there is no
setting for debating what everyone deserves, no method for ensuring
that choices are real for everyone, and no coordination of the infor-MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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mation and accountability standards that no private individuals or
groups can ensure.
The push for using public dollars to pay for private and religious
schools poses a challenge to the shared context that connects private
and public lives. Although the commitment to pluralism, religious
freedom, and parental rights has long promised parents the authority
to opt out of the common public schools,
240 that option has remained
until now just that: an option, leaving in place public schooling as the
norm. Only the public schools have received direct public support, al-
though nonprofit private schools remain eligible for the more modest
assistance of tax exemption and incidental aid for transportation and
books.
241 The current school-choice movement calls for directing the
funds set aside by society to educate youth outside of this public sys-
tem. Channeled by parents to a variety of schools of their own choice,
the funds may not violate the existing constitutional scruples against
direct public aid to religious schools. Nevertheless, this very chan-
neling dismantles the idea of a common school, open to all, capable
of integrating students from a variety of backgrounds, and committed
to inculcating a shared American tradition. However elusive that
ideal has been— given racial and class segregation and implicit pref-
erences for particular versions of the American tradition—the ideal
itself has both symbolized and fertilized the shared context that binds
diverse Americans together. Without that ideal, the prospects for a
common language and for a public domain in which citizens grapple
to frame the common good become far less certain.
The injection of private religious options into the delivery of wel-
fare services is perhaps less worrisome because food and shelter, job
training, and drug treatment do not hold the place of civic and cul-
tural meaning that schooling does. Here the risk lies more in unwit-
ting, or witting, exclusions and coercions violating the freedoms that
have imbued the nation’s ideals.
Recognizing the power of arguments for school choice and chari-
table choice, I do not think that constitutional law should prevent at
least small-scale initiatives in these directions. Indeed there is a need
for experimentation in these areas, in which so many prior efforts
240.S e e  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). However, even the parental right to opt out of public education has
limits, “if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
241.S e e  supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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have failed so many people in need. However, the details will pro-
foundly influence the prospects for commonality, respect across dif-
ferent groups, and inclusion. Four kinds of federal and state regula-
tions should frame any options that become eligible for public funds
in the contexts of schooling and welfare reform.
First, no private school or program should be eligible for payment
through public dollars or vouchers if it excludes individuals on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or nationality.
242 Second, any religious school
receiving public funds or vouchers must engage in educational pro-
gramming to address the legacies of intergroup hatred and conflict
and to promote tolerance and respect across religious, racial, and
ethnic groups. Such programs should include not only in-class curric-
ula but also extracurricular music, sports, and other activities directly
connecting students with peers from other schools of different or no
religious affiliation. Here it would be important that students from
different schools join in the same teams, orchestras, and theater
groups—not merely participating in opposing or competing groups—
so that students actually have the chance to work together on com-
mon projects and to get to know one another in that context.
243 Third,
neither charitable-choice nor school voucher programs should be al-
lowed to eliminate a genuinely accessible and attractive secular op-
tion for people who do not want to deal with a religious provider of
services or schooling. Fourth, all participating programs and schools
must supply comparable information to watchdog and public groups
to permit comparisons of their operations and outcomes. These re-
quirements offer a minimal guard against segregated, self-confirming
enclaves and the erosion of the shared public space necessary to a
complex, pluralistic society.
Though some private religious providers may find these condi-
tions too intrusive or onerous, they can always opt out of participa-
tion. Moreover, none of these conditions dictates how a private entity
should run its services; they simply identify basic criteria for eligibil-
242. Given the ongoing research about the value of same-sex education, same-sex job
training programs, same-sex drug and alcohol treatment programs, and services tailored for
individuals with particular disabilities, I would not be ready to ban exclusion on the basis of sex
and disability by particular programs, so long as the system as a whole ensures comparable
treatment opportunities for all—but this requires the maintenance of some system-level analy-
sis and evaluation, rather than simple reliance on market results.
243. See generally MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND
THE LAW 128-31 (1997) (reviewing research about such integrative programs).MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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ity. Would such requirements be politically feasible?
244 If adopted,
would they be administrable? These are fair questions that I hope
will be aired and addressed if religious groups and others participate
in a broad public debate about how to arrange for social provision in
a pluralist society committed to tolerance, liberty, and equality. That
debate could, and should, be informed by the failure of simple solu-
tions and the efficacy of complex ones.
Initiatives that do seem to work involve complex mixtures of re-
sources: public and private, federal and local, professional and lay,
legal and cultural. Consider, for example, Head Start. A federal pro-
gram with roots in the religious activism of communities of Southern
women, Head Start has always combined federal and local norms, as
well as federal and local representatives.
245 Mandated roles for paren-
tal involvement make Head Start an unusual but intriguing example
of the way in which national law can structure gestures of care and
encourage respect for those who are otherwise constructed as the
needy. Public and private agencies collaborate in training, delivery of
services, and evaluation. There is nothing simple about it. Another
example is the Indianapolis Front Porch Alliance.
246 The city, led by a
Republican mayor, initiated work with community organizations and
244. Many of the religious groups most likely to participate in charitable choice and in the
running of schools will resist regulations that seem to bring the government inside their worlds.
Indeed the stifling, bureaucratic quality of regulation is precisely what seems to argue for the
use of alternatives to meet human needs. However, if public dollars are at stake, public values
should frame the outer bounds of their use. Those organizations that refuse principles of non-
discrimination, participation in districtwide activities, and the sharing of information can cer-
tainly choose not to accept the public dollars. It is worth noting that public solicitude for relig-
ious activities can be expressed in different degrees. Direct contractual relationships create
more mutual involvement than do vouchers. Tax-exempt status, on the other hand, provides
support less directly than both contracts and vouchers, but even tax-exempt status can, and
should, be denied where the religious entity violates national norms. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983) (upholding an Internal Revenue Service decision to
deny tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination).
245. See Richard C. Boldt, A Study in Regulatory Method, Local Political Cultures, and Ju-
risprudential Voice: The Application of Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head Start, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2325, 2343-45 (1995); Lucie White, On the Guarding of Borders, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 189 (1998); Lucie White, “Why Do You Treat Us So Badly?”: On Loss,
Remembrance, and Responsibility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 809, 813-14 (1996). See generally
EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN MUENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S
MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT (1992).
246. See Jo Loconte, The Bully and the Pulpit: A New Model for Church-State Partnerships,
J. AM. CITIZENSHIP, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 28; Stephen Goldsmith, Sources of Strength in Com-
munity, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 27, 1998, at A11; David Holmstrom, Front Porch Alliance
Fosters Church-City Cooperation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 13, 1998, at 12.MINOW TO PRINTER.DOC 01/20/00  2:51 PM
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religious congregations to create a kind of “civic switchboard con-
necting private and appropriate public resources with grassroots
leaders” to meet community needs while helping to shape values, to
instill hope, and to honor virtue.
247 The public role involves monetary
support and symbolic endorsement, as well as matchmaking and in-
formation-sharing.
248 The community organizations and religious
groups now meet the needs of far more individuals—not merely
those whom they see and identify on their own—because the gov-
ernment has engaged, rather than displaced, these local and rooted
sources of authority and commitment.
249
Perhaps there is some comfort in messy realities that defy simple
models.
250 Ours is not a nation that has ever abandoned, or foresee-
ably ever would abandon, the complex mix of authority, responsibil-
ity, and community found in the parallel realms of the public and pri-
vate, the religious and secular, the local and regional, and the state
and federal. In responding to the poor and in educating children, ours
is a complex and untidy system. “‘America, it would seem, is mi-
raculously both singular and plural, organized and scattered, united
and diffused.’”
251 Can this complexity be preserved alongside com-
mitments to justice, liberty, and as much solidarity as is compatible
with each? Can our traditional pluralism be strengthened by collec-
tive discussions of human need? The public square should be filled
with boisterous, conflicting views about how to address these ques-
tions. It should also sustain and deepen the commitment to enlarge
the “we,” the sense of who is in this life together, of who is within the
ambit of concern and the community of participants. Ensuring this is
the challenge of the current moment.
247.S e e  Goldsmith, supra note 246, at A11.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250.C f .  Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1998) (admiring a sculpture by Arnaldo Pomodoro, located
by the United Nations building, depicting a cracked globe with another, cracked sphere
emerging from inside as a metaphor for the dynamism, potency, and emergent probabilities of
politics guided by principles to which people of vastly different backgrounds can appeal).
251. MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS
OF  AMERICAN  CIVILIZATION 57 (1973) (quoting HENRY  S. KARIEL, THE  DECLINE OF
AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961) (page number omitted in original)).